The Marriage of Human Rights Codes and Section 15 of the Charter in Pursuit of Equality: A Case for the Greater Separation in both Theory and Practice by MacKay, Wayne
	  THE MARRIAGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS CODES AND 
SECTION 15 OF THE CHARTER IN PURSUIT OF EQUALITY: 
A CASE FOR GREATER SEPARATION IN BOTH 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
 
 
A. Wayne MacKay* 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: FROM ENRICHMENT TO CONTAMINATION   55 
II. BACK TO BASICS: DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL ROLES AND APPROACHES  57 
a. CHALLENGING BENEFIT SCHEMES – BLURRING THE LINES  61 
III. TESTS FOR DISCRIMINATION: SECTION 15(1) OF THE CHARTER   
 AND O’MALLEY’S PRIMA FACIE CASE     62 
a. THE ANDREWS ERA: HAPPY UNION     62 
b. THE LAW ERA: STRAINS EMERGE     65 
c. CONVERGENCE ON GOVERNMENT BENEFITS    67 
d. THE LAW/DIGNITY HANGOVER     70 
e. THE KAPP ERA: NEW TESTS?     73 
IV. COMPARATOR GROUPS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONTEXT   75 
a. ACADEMIC CONCERNS ABOUT COMPARATORS    76 
b. THE MOORE CASE      77 
c. CHILD WELFARE SERVICES FOR FIRST NATIONS CHILDREN  81 
V. AMELIORATIVE PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS UNDER SECTION 15(2)  
 OF THE CHARTER AND UNDER HUMAN RIGHTS CODES   83 
a. THE DANGERS OF A TOUGH LOVE APPROACH    83 
b. PURPOSES VERSUS EFFECTS     85 
c. RATIONAL CONNECTION      85 
d. AMELIORATIVE OBJECT      87 
e. AMELIORATIVE/SPECIAL PROGRAMS     88 
VI. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DISCRIMINATION: SECTION 1 OF THE CHARTER  
 AND THE BONA FIDE JUSTIFICATIONS     90 
a. MEIRORIN/GRISMER ANALYSIS     91 
b. PARALLELS BETWEEN REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND   
SECTION 1 CHARTER ANALYSIS     92 
c. DEFERENCE IS CRITICAL      94 
VII. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR EQUALITY SEEKERS: REMEDIES OF LAST RESORT 97 
a. ACCESS TO JUSTICE      101 
 
 
 
 
                                                
* A. Wayne MacKay, CM, QC, is Professor of Law at Dalhousie University, Schulich School of Law. 
This paper was written with assistance from Gillian Angrove and Victoria Young. 
[2013] THE MARRIAGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS CODES AND SECTION 15  
      
55 
 
I. INTRODUCTION FROM ENRICHMENT TO CONTAMINATION 
 
Like many marriages, the equality provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
and Canada’s human rights codes began with the hope and expectation that the 
experiences of each one would enrich the other. Both legal structures pursue a fairer 
and more egalitarian society, and there was optimism that the two traditions would 
reinforce each other and make life better for victims of discrimination. In an evolving 
symbiotic relationship, the concept of substantive equality would be advanced and 
Commissions, Tribunals and Courts would collaborate in producing a more 
egalitarian Canadian society. While not stated in these grandiose terms, these were 
the seeds planted by Justice McIntyre in the first section 15 case of Andrews v BC 
Law Society.  In Andrews, McIntyre J advocates building the Charter’s equality 
jurisprudence on the foundation of Canada’s experiences with statutory human rights 
codes.1 
 
 
 Unfortunately as with too many marriages, the union of Charter equality 
and human rights codes has not always been a positive one and the Charter has 
become more of a burden than a benefit to its statutory partner. Indeed, many now 
argue that the importation of Charter equality concepts into the interpretation of 
human rights codes has limited the goal of substantive equality and reduced access to 
justice for front line victims of discrimination. As Professor Leslie Reaume rightly 
argues, the nature of the Charter should be a source of enrichment for human rights 
codes and not a source of contamination. 
 
 
[B]orrowing from the Charter context to the statutory context is 
appropriate so long as the exercise enriches the substantive equality 
analysis, is consistent with the limits of statutory interpretation, and 
advances the purpose and quasi-constitutional status of the enabling 
statute. The objection raised in this paper is not to the interplay but to the 
manner in which Charter principles, specifically those articulated in the 
decision in the Charter, are imported and then allowed to dominate an 
analysis which should be driven first by the principles of statutory 
interpretation, and second by the jurisprudence which has developed 
specifically in the regulatory context. 2 
 
 
 One of the ways in which the Charter might enrich human rights code 
jurisprudence would be in respect to theory. Both mechanisms are intended to reduce 
                                                
1 Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 SCR 143, at 175. He does also recognize that there 
are differences between the statutory and constitutional structures as well as points of convergence. 
 
2 Leslie Reaume, “Postcards from O’Malley: Reinvigorating Statutory Human Rights Jurisprudence in the 
Age of the Charter” in Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike, and M Kate Stephenson, eds, Making Equality 
Rights Real: Securing Substantive Equality under the Charter (Toronto, Irwin Law, 2006) at 375. 
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discrimination in Canadian society and advance the cause of substantive equality. 
Substantive equality takes account of differences where appropriate and recognizes 
that formally neutral rules can have adverse and discriminatory effects on vulnerable 
groups in society. Thus one could expect some overlap in theory and even the legal 
tests to be applied. However, the marriage of the two systems has its limits in theory 
as well as practice. 
 
 
 Theory is about thinking systematically about what we think the ultimate 
goals are. In this sense there is nothing as practical as good theory. It helps decision-
makers understand the value choices that they make. However, theory must be set in 
a practical and specific context and leave room for flexibility. This is true in all areas 
of the law but is particularly relevant to the complex pursuit of equality. 
 
 
 Theories, structures, and tests help to produce predictability and certainty in 
the law, including laws pertaining to equality. On the other hand, flexibility and 
context are always important in producing justice and equality in a particular case. 
The challenge is to strike the correct balance between structure and predictability on 
the one hand and flexibility and context on the other. 
 
 
 The case-by-case bottom up approach of the common law has been rejected 
in respect to discrimination in favour of a more theoretical top down approach to 
equality.3 This is an important reality in the consideration of a balanced equality 
structure in Canada.  
 
 
 Professor Denise Reaume contrasts two methodologies for the design and 
development over time of legal norms: the top-down model of the comprehensive 
code designed to bring to life a grand theory about the norms regulating human 
interactions, and the bottom-up model of case-by-case analysis, aiming toward the 
development of a set of principals explaining and justifying individual decisions. The 
author argues the latter is better suited to creating and changing norms in the 
discrimination law area. However, the abdication of responsibility by the common 
law has led to the legislatures intervening in their typical top-down style. Without a 
grand theory (e.g., definition of discrimination etc.) the statutory rules become 
arbitrary pigeonholes into which complainants must fit their fact situation or fail.4 
In early Charter section 15 cases such as Egan v Canada, Justice L’Heureux-Dube 
expresses a similar frustration with an excessive focus on grounds of discrimination 
into which all claims must be fitted. 
 
 
                                                
3 Seneca College v. Bhaudaria, [1981] 2 SCR 181.  
4 Denise G Reaume, “Of Pigeonholes and Principles: A Reconsideration of Discrimination Law” (2002) 
40 Osgoode Hall LJ 113. 
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By looking at the grounds for the distinction instead of at the impact of the 
distinction on particular groups, we risk undertaking an analysis that is 
distanced and desensitized from real people’s real experiences.5 
 
 Because of the limited role played by courts in pursuing equality and the 
rejection of a common law bottom up approach to equality, human rights codes play 
an important and continuing role in pursuing equality. There is obviously room for 
overlap and cross fertilization between the Charter and human rights codes but the 
tests and theories that properly apply in one context do not necessarily work in the 
other one. Some marriage of the two structures may well be fruitful, but the distinct 
and separate identities of the two partners should not be lost. As will be explored in 
the next section, courts and human rights tribunals play different institutional roles 
within the Canadian legal structure. 
 
 
II. BACK TO BASICS: DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL ROLES AND APPROACHES 
 
As with many complex legal problems it may be helpful to get back to some basics. 
Section 15 of the Charter is a constitutional provision that is entrenched and superior 
to other forms of law. Human rights codes are statutes, and while frequently 
described as “quasi-constitutional”, they are not entrenched and can still be changed 
by the normal process of a majority vote in the relevant legislature. Thus one would 
expect that section 15 of the Charter would be a more powerful guardian of equality 
than statutory human rights codes. Both the Charter and human rights codes are 
committed to pursuing substantive equality and therefore a critical question arises: 
when should the two institutional structures converge and diverge? 
 
 
 Bruce Ryder, Cidalia Faria and Emily Lawrence refer to Eldridge v British 
Columbia to say that: 
 
Section 15 has two purposes: ensuring that laws avoid treating individuals 
according to irrelevant personal characteristics, and ensuring that laws 
avoid further subordination of already disadvantaged groups.6 
 
The authors also note that section 15 of the Charter raises some fundamental 
questions about the different roles of the institutional players in a Canadian 
democracy. 
 
                                                
5 Egan v Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 513 at para 53. L’Heureux-Dube’s approach is supported and elaborated 
in Daphne Gilbert, “Time to Regroup: Rethinking Section 15 of the Charter” (2003) 48 McGill LJ 627-
649.  
6 Bruce Ryder, Cidalia C. Faria & Emily Lawrence, “What’s Law Good For? An Empirical Overview of 
Charter Equality Rights Decisions” (2004) 24 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 103, at 107. – citing Eldridge v British 
Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 SCR 624 at para 54. This same approach was supported in later 
cases such as Eaton v Brant County Board of Education, [1997] 1 SCR 241. 
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 In a society characterized by persistent inequalities, the judiciary could 
enlist section 15 in the redistribution of a wide range of legal and material 
entitlements. Section 15 thus implicates, in a particularly profound 
manner, the appropriate division of responsibility between courts and 
legislatures in a constitutional democracy.7 
 
 
 Courts have been cautious in their approach to section 15. This may be 
because section 15 deals with such fundamental values, and courts believe these 
fundamental issues are better suited to the legislative or executive branches. Thus 
courts have been inclined to be deferential to the other levels of the state at both the 
violation and section 1 limitation stages. 
 
 
 This may in part explain the low success rate for section 15 claims, 
compared to those under most other sections of the Charter. Ryder’s study is one of 
the few empirical studies and it considered more than 350 cases (including some 
lower court rulings) between 1989-2004.  
 
 
Overall, the data suggests that the success rate of section 15 claims has 
been relatively low, compared to Charter claims generally, throughout the 
Andrews decade and the first five years under Law. The data does not 
support the view that the Andrews test operated in a manner more 
supportive of equality claimants. Nor does it support the view that the 
courts have been particularly receptive to the claims of equality-seeking 
groups. For example, examining the record of Supreme Court decisions, it 
is striking that six of the nine grounds of discrimination listed in section 
15 have not given rise to a single successful claim (race, national origin, 
ethnic origin, colour, religion, mental disability). Since there have been 
either no claims considered by the Court, or very few, on each of these 
grounds, this is a reminder that the costs of litigation remain the most 
formidable barrier to the affirmation and protection of equality rights….  
 
Interestingly, the success rate of claims based on sex discrimination is 25 
percent (2/8), and in the two successful cases, the claimants were men.8 
 
 
 The deference shown by courts in section 15 claims is even more 
pronounced when the effect of a successful claim would be to require the relevant 
government to spend significant sums of money.9 The reluctance of courts to act is 
even greater when the rights claim can be construed as a positive obligation on the 
state rather than a negative prohibition to refrain from acting. 
                                                
7 Ryder, ibid at 104. 
8 Ibid at 115. 
9 Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84, 4 SCR 429 and Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v 
British Columbia (Attorney General) 2004 SCC 78, 3 SCR 657 are but two examples of this. Moore v. 
British Columbia 2012 SCC 61 is at least in part an exception to this rule. 
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The recognition of a positive dimension to rights to equality and rights to 
life, liberty and security of the person, and the imposition of 
corresponding obligations on government, is important for many equality-
seeking groups, especially for people with disabilities.…  
 
Courts’ reluctance to impose positive obligations on government under 
rights to equality can be largely attributed to deference toward executive 
and legislative decisions on the allocation of scarce resource and the 
prioritization of competing policy concerns.10 
 
The comparative role of courts and human rights tribunals in respect to social and 
economic rights has been explored elsewhere.11 
 
 
 While there is no doubt that the courts are the primary players in a section 
15 Charter claim, both the legislative and executive branches have roles to play in 
respect to human rights codes. It is the relevant legislature that enacts the codes and 
has the authority to amend or even repeal the statutes. Both the commissions and 
tribunals are created by statute and are in some respects extensions of the executive 
branch of government, even though they claim a measure of independence.  
  
 
 Other academic commentators have explored the differences in institutional 
structures: 
 
 
Ontario’s Human Rights Code is provincial legislation, it can be, and has 
been, amended in the manner of any other provincial legislation. It binds 
the Crown and prevails over other legislation. The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly described human rights legislation as fundamental and quasi-
constitutional. The Code applies to particular areas of social life rather 
than to particular social actors, and it applies equally to government and 
private actors. The Code is a comprehensive scheme, and it specifically 
identifies which groups have been subjected to historic disadvantage and 
are to be protected by legislation.12  
 
 Denise Reaume emphasizes the opportunity for the legislature to balance 
the competing interests at play in equality claims, within the statutory structure itself. 
 
The structure of the OHRC makes clear that the legislature has taken great 
pains to balance the right to equal treatment and the legitimate interests of 
                                                
10 Cara Wilkie & Meryl Zisman Gary, “Positive and Negative Rights under the Charter: Closing the 
Divide to Advance Equality” (2011) 30 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 37 at 38 and 44 respectively. 
11 Wayne MacKay, “Social and Economic Rights in Canada: Who Can Best Protect Them?” (2009) 45 
Sup Ct L Rev 385. 
12 Lesli Bisgould, “Twists and Turns and Seventeen Volumes of Evidence, or How Procedural 
Developments Might Have Influenced Substantive Human Rights Law” (2012) 9 JL & Equality 5 at 17. 
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 respondents.  If its complex structure achieves that balance fairly through 
the interplay of factual prima facie case and variously tailored exemptions, 
there is no reason to tamper with it. The significance of the spheres 
included in the codes, together with creating exemptions wherever 
fairness requires, seals the argument that narrowing the scope of 
discrimination by increasing the threshold at the prima facie stage is an 
unworthy interpretation of the codes. It is precisely the significance of the 
spheres in this balance that the Court of Appeal seems not to appreciate in 
Tranchemontagne.13 
 
 
 Leslie Reaume provides a good review of the points of convergence and 
divergence between the Charter and human rights codes. She notes that the two are 
similar in that: 
 
 
Both the Charter and human rights statutes share the goal of achieving 
substantive equality, and are driven by similar underlying principles, such 
as the promotion of human dignity, the recognition of the benefits of 
diversity, and the pursuit of activities related to full citizenship: all of 
these principles ground a broad, liberal, purposive interpretation by 
adjudicators and courts. In both arenas, discrimination means something 
more than mere distinction. Both schemes are also anti-majoritarian 
instruments, and adjudicators and judges frequently attract criticism for 
“activism” on interpreting them in favour of claimants. They are also 
beset by the same challenges in attempting to advance substantive equality 
within the limits of “prohibited grounds.” 14 
 
 
 She goes on to note that the two structures diverge in that they “arise in 
different social and legal contexts which is a significant factor in the interpretation of 
those instruments, including the development of definitions of discrimination.”15 
Leslie Reaume also considers that “[h]uman rights legislation is regulatory in nature. 
It establishes and regulates a limited set of entitlements and expectations between 
individuals in the context of their private relationships and in the interaction of 
individuals with government service providers and employers”.16 Comparatively, the 
Charter “prohibits discrimination which arises by the application or operation of law 
and is invoked only against a government actor.”17 Finally, Leslie Reaume notes that 
the Charter has “much greater potential for advancing the equality rights of 
                                                
13 Denise Reaume, “Defending the Human Rights Codes from the Charter” (2012) 9 JL & Equality 67 at 
94. 
14 Supra note 2 at 382.  
15 Supra note 2 at 383-384. 
16 Supra note 2 at 384.  
17 Supra note 2 at 384.   
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historically disadvantaged groups, through a focus on the experience of dominance 
and subordination that arise through the operation of law and government policy.”18 
 
 
  There are also other important differences such as the different dispute 
resolution processes.  The human rights structures offer a wide variety of processes 
including mediation and more recently restorative approaches, before reaching a 
more adversarial tribunal stage. Also, human rights commissions and tribunals may 
have more comparative expertise in human rights than more generalist courts. They 
operate in related but different contexts and many of the problems that will be 
discussed in this article arise from a failure to take proper account of the different 
contexts and institutional roles. 
 
 
 A. CHALLENGING BENEFIT SCHEMES – BLURRING THE LINES 
  
Claire Mumme links these contextual differences to the comparative roles of the 
Charter and human rights codes in the pursuit of equality in Canada. Problems have 
particularly arisen since human rights codes have been used to challenge government 
benefit schemes in ways that have traditionally been done by a constitutional 
challenge. 
 
In a system of government that is based on parliamentary sovereignty as 
well as on a separation of powers between the legislature, executive, and 
judiciary, the human rights codes have come to take on an extraordinary 
role, and the human rights tribunals have come to occupy an unusual 
position. The codes, which are ordinarily enacted statutes (albeit quasi-
constitutional ones), have been used to review the substance and 
administration of other statutes, in a manner that is seemingly at odds with 
the principles of parliamentary sovereignty, according to which only the 
Constitution limits the legislature's ability to legislate. And the tribunals, 
hybrid executive judicial actors, have been able to act as arbiters of 
decisions by the executive and legislative branches of government in 
regard to public spending.19 
 
The author provides an historical account of human rights litigation, going back to 
the Bill of Rights and then forward. The historical account focuses on government 
services cases in the era of the Bill of Rights, pre-Charter, Charter, and post-Law 
and examines what led the courts to allowing quasi-constitutional tribunals to decide 
on other statutes/statutory schemes. This is illustrated through case-law.  
 
The expanding reach of human rights statutes suggests that its 
adjudicators now rival the superior courts as sites for public law 
adjudication. However, it is perhaps also exactly for this reason that the 
                                                
18 Supra note 2 at 384. 
19 Claire Mumme, “At the Crossroads in Discrimination Law: How the Human Rights Codes Overtook the 
Charter in Canadian Government Services Cases” (2012) 9 JL & Equality 103, at 106-107. 
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 door has opened to the use of constitutional jurisprudence in the statutory 
framework and that judicial decision makers have been receptive to claims 
of merger between these two instruments.  Put simply, while the questions 
of the human rights codes' supremacy and of what constitutes a "service" 
have been effectively closed, a new unease has emerged with using an 
administrative tribunal to review legislative and executive decisions under 
a less deferential standard than is brought to the same questions under the 
Charter.20 
 
 
 We agree with Mumme that the government services cases are at the heart 
of the process of blurring the lines between equality challenges under human rights 
codes and the Charter. It does seem contrary to the natural constitutional order that 
government programs can be more effectively challenged by human rights codes 
than section 15 of the Charter. However, this may reflect more on the high degree of 
deference shown in Charter equality claims and the answer is not to treat the human 
rights challenges in the same way. If the view is that human rights code challenges 
are going too far in the benefits area, the relevant statutes can be amended by the 
legislature. The problems of merging the section 15 Charter approaches with those at 
the prima facie stage of human rights code analysis are further magnified when these 
codes are applied in the private sector.  
 
 
 We turn in the next section to the complex questions arising from importing 
the more demanding Charter standard for finding an equality violation into the 
human rights code context. The case for some degree of separate approaches is 
fortified by the larger issues of institutional roles discussed above. 
 
 
III. TESTS FOR DISCRIMINATION: SECTION 15(1) OF THE CHARTER AND 
O’MALLEY’S PRIMA FACIE CASE 
 
 
 A. THE ANDREWS ERA:  HAPPY UNION 
 
As alluded to earlier, the original Andrew’s test for finding a violation of section 
15(1) of the Charter was based on the approach to discrimination in statutory human 
rights codes. Indeed Justice McIntyre emphasizes in Andrews that section 15 of the 
Charter is not an all-purpose guarantee of equality but rather a ban on discrimination 
pursuant to laws. The cornerstone of section 15 in McIntyre’s analysis is 
discrimination, and does not envision remedying all distinctions, even those with 
adverse effects. The origins of this cross fertilization between section 15 of the 
Charter and human rights codes is succinctly recognized and affirmed by the 
                                                
20 Ibid at 135. See also supra note 2 at 374. Reaume emphasizes that there are two major consequences of 
importing a Charter standard – (1) raising the burden of proof and (2) diverting attention from the human 
rights statue.  
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following passage from the well articulated reasons of Justice Rowles in British 
Columbia (Ministry of Education) v Moore. 
 
Without doubt, there is considerable cross-fertilization between statutory 
human rights cases and equality cases decided under the Charter. In 
Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 56 
D.L.R. (4th) 1 [Andrews cited to S.C.R.], the first decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada under s. 15 of the Charter, McIntyre J. held, at 175, that, 
in general, the principles which have been applied under human rights 
codes are equally applicable in considering questions of discrimination 
under s. 15(1) of the Charter. He defined “discrimination” for the 
purposes of s. 15(1) by reference to prior human rights jurisprudence, as 
follows (at 174): 
 
I would say then that discrimination may be described as a 
distinction, whether intentional or not but based on grounds 
relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group, 
which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or 
disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon 
others, or which withholds or limits access to opportunities, 
benefits, and advantages available to other members of society. 
 
Subsequent to Andrews, the interplay has continued and McIntrye J.’s 
description of discrimination has been regularly employed in the 
adjudication of statutory human rights claims: see Battlefords and District 
Co-operative Ltd. v. Gibbs, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 566, 140 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at 
para. 20 [Gibbs]; McGill University Health Centre (Montreal General 
Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal, 
2007 SCC 4, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 161 at para. 47, Abella J. concurring; 
International Forest Products Ltd. v. Sandhu, 2008 BCCA 204, 82 
B.C.L.R. (4th) 35 at paras. 24–32 [Sandhu].21 
 
 
 The interplay between the Andrews definition of discrimination and the 
same concept in human rights codes is emphasized not only by its use in adjudicating 
human rights cases but also its inclusion as the statutory definition in the Nova Scotia 
Human Rights Act.22 Furthermore, academic commentators have identified human 
rights jurisprudence as one of the key sources for giving meaning to the elusive 
concept of Charter equality. 
 
In resolving the challenges posed by section 15 of the Charter, the courts 
have drawn significant guidance from anti-discrimination jurisprudence 
developed under Canadian human rights statutes, from the experience of 
other nations and from international law.23 
                                                
21 British Columbia (Ministry of Education) v. Moore 2010 BCCA 478 at paras 40 and 41, 12 BCLR (5th) 
246. 
22 Nova Scotia Human Rights Act, RSNS 1989, c 214, s 4. 
23 Ryder, supra note 6 at 105. 
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 It would thus appear that there was considerable convergence between the 
concept of discrimination in human rights codes and the constitutional concept of 
equality as articulated in Andrews.  The marriage of section 15 of the Charter and 
human rights codes appeared to be a beneficial union. In these happier days there 
was no suggestion that the Charter approach to equality replaced the established test 
for finding a prima facie case of discrimination as articulated by the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Ontario (Human Rights) v Simpsons Sears Ltd. (referred to as 
O’Malley).24 The essence of this test is set out by Justice Rowles in Moore as 
follows: 
 
To make out prima facie discrimination in the provision of a service under 
s. 8(1) of the Code pursuant to O’Malley, human rights cases have 
generally held that a complainant must establish on a balance of 
probabilities that: 
 
1. There is a service customarily available to the public; 
2. The complainant is a member of a group possessing a characteristic 
or   characteristics protected under the Code; 
3. The complainant was denied the service, or was discriminated 
against in the provision of a service; and 
4. The protected characteristic was a factor in the denial or 
discrimination.25 
 
 
 In line with her general agreement with the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Rowles in the British Columbia Court of Appeal, Justice Abella for the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Moore v British Columbia agrees with the above description of 
the prima facie case test. 
 
As the tribunal properly recognized, to demonstrate prima facie 
discrimination, complainants are required to show that they have a 
characteristic protected from discrimination under the Code; that they 
experienced an adverse impact with respect to the service; and that the 
protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact. Once a prima 
facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the respondent to 
justify the conduct or practice, within the framework of the exemptions 
available under human rights statutes. If it cannot be justified, 
discrimination will be found to occur.26 
 
 
 This is a clear indication that the Supreme Court of Canada does not agree 
with those who argue that the traditional human rights code test for violation has 
                                                
24 Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v Simpsons Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 SCR 536 [O’Malley]. 
25 Supra note 21 at para 36. 
26 Moore, supra note 9 at para 33. 
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been modified by the section 15 Charter jurisprudence. As the following pages 
indicate not everyone saw it so clearly. 
 
 
 B. THE LAW ERA:  STRAINS EMERGE  
 
Problems began to develop after the reformulation of the test for section 15 
violations in Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration).27 In simple 
terms the Law test repeated the Andrews requirements for a (1) distinction (by either 
an action or failure to take account of differences); (2) based upon an enumerated or 
analogous ground but added that (3) the action or omission is only discriminatory if 
it imposes a burden or withholds a benefit in a way that promotes stereotypes or a 
view that the claimant is less worthy of recognition. This third element required that 
the claimant prove a violation of “dignity” a term that is at least as elusive as the 
concept of equality itself. 
 
 
 This was widely regarded by academics and others as narrowing the scope 
of Charter equality.  The change placed additional burdens of proof on the claimant 
and imported balancing considerations into the section 15 analysis that should have 
been considered at the section 1 justification stage.28 As the cases unfolded these 
problems did emerge29 and the concerns about a retreat from substantive to formal 
equality were validated (at least in part) by the Supreme Court of Canada in Kapp.30 
It is interesting to note that in a rare empirical study of the claimants’ success rates 
under section 15 of the Charter, the success rate actually improved under the Law 
test compared to the Andrews decade. However, Ryder et al. suggest there are many 
qualifications to this surprising conclusion.31 One limitation is that their study covers 
only the first 5 years of the Law era. 
 
 
 Some human rights tribunals and courts began to import both the violation 
of “dignity” component from Law, and a more formal comparator group analysis. 
The latter will be discussed further on in this article. In British Columbia 
Government and Service Employees’ Union v British Columbia (Public Services 
                                                
27 Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR 497. 
28 R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41, at para 22, 2 SCR 483. The Court noted that “as critics have pointed out, 
human dignity is an abstract and subjective notion that, even with the guidance of the four contextual 
factors, cannot only become confusing and difficult to apply; it has also proven to be an additional burden 
on equality claimants, rather than the philosophical enhancement it was intended to be. Criticism has also 
accrued for the way Law has allowed the formalism of some of the Court's post-Andrews jurisprudence to 
resurface in the form of an artificial comparator analysis focused on treating likes alike.” 
29 See Gosselin, supra note 9 and Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada 
(Attorney General), 2004 SCC 4, 1 SCR 76.  
30 Kapp, supra note 28.  
31 Ryder, supra note 6. 
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Employee Relations Commission) (referred to as Reaney)32 and British Columbia 
School Employers’ Association v British Columbia Teachers’ Federation (referred to 
as Teachers)33 the courts applied the Law test in the human rights code context. In 
Reaney the concern was with the term of a collective agreement that was premised 
on a government benefits program, which had been found to not violate section 15 of 
the Charter. Lambert J.A. found that the Law test was a relevant point of reference, 
even if not applied as a strict test. 
 
 
 In the Teachers case, also in a labour context and involving employee 
benefits and the possible co-ordination of benefits between married teachers, the 
allegation was discrimination based upon marital status. Once again some of the 
justices referred to the Law test as well as the traditional O’Malley test for a prima 
facie case of discrimination. 
 
 
 In a third British Columbia case, Armstrong v British Columbia (Ministry of 
Health)34 the issue was the discrimination on the basis of sex for providing less 
funding for the prevention by screening of prostate cancer, compared to breast cancer 
in women. The human rights tribunal found no violation by applying parallel Law 
and O’Malley analyses and that decision was reversed on judicial review at the trial 
level, because of the Law analysis. At the British Columbia Court of Appeal the 
original tribunal decision was restored on the basis that the Law analysis was only an 
alternative analysis. 
 
 
 In reaching this decision Justice Tysoe in Armstrong made a clear case for 
continuing to treat Charter and human rights code situations as both overlapping but 
still distinct. 
 
There is considerable promise in maintaining distinct analytical 
frameworks between the Charter and the statutory human rights arenas.  
The challenge will be to find ways to develop analytical concepts which 
give life to the purposes which underlie these important instruments, 
appreciating that they are linked by the grander purpose of eradicating 
discrimination.  The goal should be an interactive framework which 
provides opportunities for enriching equality rights jurisprudence and 
advancing substantive equality without supplanting the principles 
developed specifically for the issues which arise in these two distinct 
contexts.35 
                                                
32 British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union v British Columbia (Public Services 
Employee Relations Commission), 2002 BCCA 476, 4 BCLR (4th) 301 [Reaney]. 
33 British Columbia School Employers’ Association v British Columbia Teachers’ Federation, 2003 
BCCA 323, 15 BCLR (4th) 58. 
34 Armstrong v British Columbia (Ministry of Health), 2010 BCCA 56, 2 BCLR (5th) 290. 
35 Ibid at para 36. 
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It is interesting that his sentiments echo those of some academic commentators 
calling for an interactive process that enriches but does not limit.36 
 
 
 C. CONVERGENCE ON GOVERNMENT BENEFITS 
 
It is not accidental that the above British Columbia cases are governmental in nature 
and involve in some way the distribution of benefits. Benjamin Oliphant argues that 
the application of a Charter-like test at the prima facie stage appears to be 
particularly attractive to courts in cases that involve the government’s provision of 
services. This is especially the case where a concern is voiced that a strict application 
of the standard routinely applied to private services providers would be unfair to 
government respondents. The question of whether the Charter and code tests for 
discrimination should match is an important one, and its resolution turns on several 
complex issues including whether an approach such as that adopted in 
Tranchemontagne represents a change in the law as articulated by the Supreme Court 
of Canada, and if so, whether that change is justified.37 Oliphant attempts to show 
that in Tranchemontagne, a plain reading of the decision would suggest that the 
burden of showing the rule to be unacceptable has shifted.  The burden to show the 
rule is somehow unreasonable, arbitrary, or based on prejudice and stereotyping has 
shifted to the claimant, running directly contrary to previous code jurisprudence. He 
outlines a number of cases to support this. He concludes that:  
 
The mischief in the Tranchemontagne decision and others that follow a 
similar conceptual framework is not that these cases have necessarily 
reached the wrong conclusions on the facts but, rather, that by modifying 
the procedure for establishing a successful claim they have redefined the 
scope of the prohibition on discriminations, either without averting to this 
fact or acknowledging it openly.38 
 
 
 The case of Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program) v 
Tranchemontagne39 provides a convenient backdrop against which to explore the 
question of whether, and to what extent, different and distinct routes to equality 
ought to be maintained in respect to statutory human rights structures and the 
Charter of Rights. This decision places at the forefront the issue of the appropriate 
limits that a claimant should face in being allowed to import a constitutionally rooted 
“jurisprudential frame that imposes higher burdens on claimants than those 
                                                
36 Supra note 2.  
37 Benjamin Oliphant, “Prima Facie Discrimination: Is Tranchemontagne consistent with the Supreme 
court of Canada’s Human Rights Code Jurisprudence” (2012) 9 JL & Equality 33 at 35-36. 
38 Ibid at 65. 
39 Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program) v Tranchemontagne, 2010 ONCA 593, 324 DLR (4th) 
87.  
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specifically designed for the statutory context.”40 The relevant legal test to apply 
in such cases is of great concern for the evolution of equality jurisprudence.41 
 
 
 In a later article Mumme reiterates the centrality of the core issue in 
Tranchemontagne in the following terms. 
 
In Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program) v Tranchemontagne, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal entered on to the most recent battleground in 
the world of statutory human rights law - a challenge to the content of a 
statutorily created government program under the auspices of the Ontario 
Human Rights Code (OHRC) instead of under section 15(1) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.'  The doctrinal question at 
issue was whether the traditional jurisprudential test for discrimination 
under the human rights codes should be used to analyze a challenge to a 
statute or whether that statutory standard should be displaced by the tests 
usually applied under section 15(1) of the Charter.  As I will argue, 
however, lurking beneath this doctrinal question is a set of much more 
fundamental issues about the relative purpose and scope of constitutional 
equality and statutory anti-discrimination protection in Canadian equality 
law.  
 
… 
 
In government services claims, a challenge is brought under the Human 
Rights Code to the substantive content of a statute that creates a 
government program, or discretionary decision-making under the statute's 
terms. In Tranchemontagne for instance, the challenged services were the 
Ontario Disability Support Program, created by the Ontario Disability 
Support Program Act (ODSPA), and Ontario Works (welfare), created by 
the Ontario Works Act). Such claims seek either an order requiring a 
change in administrative practice or a declaration that an offending 
legislative provision is inoperative because it violates the OHRC.  
 
These claims are thus almost identical to ones that would otherwise be 
brought under the section 15(1) constitutional equality provision, and the 
codes provide an almost identical remedy. They do so in a much more 
accessible manner because the tribunals are faster and less expensive. 
And, it can be argued, the analytical framework for determining a 
violation of the human rights codes is significantly friendlier to claimants 
than is the constitutional test.42 
 
 
 In the Tranchemontagne case the courts address a growing trend in equality 
jurisprudence – that of using the provincial human rights statutes to challenge the 
                                                
40 Claire Mumme, “Tranchemontagne – Statutory Challenges to Statutory Enactments: What is the 
Appropriate Standard” The Court  (10 September 2010), online: <http://www.thecourt.ca/>. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Supra note 19 at 103 and 104 respectively. 
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legislative content of government programs rather than making a section 15 
Charter equality claim. The central issue at all levels in this case was determining 
the appropriate test when a human rights statute rather than the Charter, is used to 
challenge a statutory benefits scheme. To what extent, if at all, should constitutional 
standards be imported into the human rights context? 
 
What legal test to apply in such cases is of profound significance for 
equality jurisprudence. Cases such as Tranchemontagne have arisen 
because of the increasing difficulties faced by equality-seeking groups in 
bringing social and economic claims under section 15 of the Charter, 
leading claimants to seek remedies elsewhere.43  
 
 
 Mumme goes on to explore why many claimants prefer the human rights 
path to that of section 15 of the Charter.44 In addition to the lower costs and greater 
accessibility associated with the human rights commission structure, she argues that 
the O’Malley prima facie test sets a lower standard for claimants to meet than the 
Charter test. As a consequence, a section 15 Charter claim has become the last legal 
resort for many claimants.45 After the Law case the marriage of human rights codes 
and the Charter has become strained and a greater degree of separation appears in 
order. This is well illustrated in Tranchemontagne, itself. 
 
 
 Specifically, in the course of deciding whether the claimants, as alcoholics 
who are disabled on account of their substance dependence, were entitled to income 
support under the Ontario Disability Support Program, the Social Benefits Tribunal 
conducted its analysis under the “rubric of the four contextual factors” contained in 
the third step of Law. They used the factors “as an analytical tool” rather than as a 
“checklist to be applied mechanically.”46 The Tribunal concluded that the human 
rights code and section 15(1) of the Charter should be interpreted in a congruent and 
consistent manner.47 For its part, the Ontario Divisional Court affirmed that these 
separate texts equally “represent guarantees of substantive equality.”48 There is “no 
question that the interpretation and application of each provision ought to inform the 
other.”49 With that said, the trial court cautions that “this does not mean that the tests 
used in one context can or should be imported wholesale into the other.”50 
 
                                                
43 Supra note 40.  
44 Supra note 40. 
45 Supra note 40.  
46 Ontario Disability Support Program v. Tranchemontagne, 2009 95 OR (3d) 327 (Div Ct) at para 118. 
47 Ibid at para 96. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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 Most recently, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Tranchemontagne sought to 
uphold the Social Benefits Tribunal’s decision on the grounds that it “explained its 
reasons for rejecting the Director’s evidence using the full Law framework” and that 
its “reasons [we]re entirely consistent with Kapp.”51 The Appellate court readily 
overlooked or disregarded the context-specific nature of the analytical concepts 
which have been developed in the respective administrative and judicial arenas.  This 
decision opens the door for an academic discussion on the dangers of courts and 
tribunals too readily importing legal ideas from one context into another. We will 
return shortly to the situation in the Kapp era of Charter analysis, but the hangover 
of the dignity analysis from Law may not be completely gone. 
 
 
 D. THE LAW/DIGNITY HANGOVER 
 
The introduction of the dignity concept into the equality analysis following Law v 
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)52 provoked a great deal of 
criticism and concern among those within the academic community. Academicians 
greatly feared that the third prong of the Law test would impose serious and crippling 
“limitations on equality claims.”53 A sincere belief existed that the addition of the 
dignity step would invariably introduce “section 1 concerns into the section 15(1) 
analysis, thereby shifting the government’s burden to justify itself onto the claimants 
as part of proving rights violations” - with the unfortunate effect that this would 
“result in fewer findings of discrimination and fewer required justifications under 
section 1.”54 
 
 
These concerns do not carry as much weight in the post-Kapp era. This is because 
the Supreme Court used Kapp as an opportunity to clarify the existing state of the 
law. It held that:  
 
Law does not impose a new and distinctive test for discrimination, but 
rather affirms the approach to substantive equality under s. 15, as set out in 
Andrews and developed in numerous subsequent decisions. The factors 
cited in Law should not be read literally as if they were legislative 
dispositions, but as a way of focusing on the central concern of s. 15 
                                                
51 Supra note 39 at para 123.  
52 Supra note 27. 
53 Caroline Hodes, “Dignity and the Conditions of Truth: What Equality Needs from Law” (2007) 19:2 
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 273 at 283. See also Donna Greschner, “Does Law Advance the 
Cause of Equality?” (2001), 27 Queen’s LJ 299; Daphne Gilbert, “Time to Regroup: Rethinking Section 
15 of the Charter” (2003), 48 McGill LJ 627; R. James Fyfe, “Dignity as Theory: Competing Conceptions 
of Human Dignity at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2007), 70 Sask L Rev 1; Dianne Pothier, 
“Connecting Grounds of Discrimination to Real People’s Real Experiences” (2001), 13 CJWL 37. 
54 Caroline Hodes, “Dignity and the Conditions of Truth: What Equality Needs from Law” (2007) 19:2 
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 273 at 282. See also Gosselin, supra note 9 and Canadian 
Foundation for Children, supra note 29.   
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identified in Andrews - combating discrimination, defined in terms of 
perpetuating disadvantage and stereotyping.55  
 
The potential for misuse and abuse of the dignity concept is much less of an issue in 
present times. The possibility that the dignity barrier might be wrongly applied and 
overextended in the human rights context is thus, by extension, a more distant and 
removed one.  
 
 
 There is little debate that the Court in Kapp distanced itself from the Law 
test when it rejected the need for an explicit consideration of the dignity concept as 
the umbrella for the four contextual factors. However, this does not mean that there 
is no value in further considering the potential dangers that arise after exporting the 
dignity analysis or other forms of Charter analysis from a constitutional forum to a 
human rights one. Human dignity may now be seen less as a discrete, additional 
hurdle.   Nevertheless, human dignity is now the “definitional objective of equality, 
as reflected in questions of whether a person is treated with equal concern, respect, 
and consideration.”56 Human dignity is an “essential value” which underlies the 
whole section 15 guarantee and appears in the preambles of many human rights 
codes. The “protection of all of the rights guaranteed by the Charter has as its 
lodestar the promotion of human dignity.”57 Indeed many human rights codes also 
refer to dignity of the individual as an underlying concept. 
 
 
 A post-Kapp definition of dignity might reasonably encompass everything 
from “having the means to subsistence, enough food, adequate shelter, adequate 
medical care, and a quality education, including skills training, protection from 
violence, protection from social exclusion, and protection from poverty.”58 In this 
way, to the extent that human dignity continues to be regarded as the hallmark of 
discrimination, the potential still exists for this Charter-based idea to be 
overextended and invoked to an unreasonable degree, within the human rights 
framework. To put it another way, insofar as the dignity concept merely “adds 
substance” to one of the already articulated purposes of the section 15 Charter 
guarantee, human rights tribunals may be enticed to consider whether a claimant has 
suffered a violation of their dignity.  
 
 
 A rights claimant need only prove prima facie discrimination before the 
onus shifts to the respondent to prove a bona fide justification encompassing 
reasonable accommodation. However, this fair and balanced shifting of the burden 
has the potential to be seriously undermined by the importation of the dignity 
                                                
55 Supra note 28 at para 24. 
56 Gilbert, supra note 53 at 630-631.  
57 Supra note 28 at para 21. 
58 Hodes, supra note 53 at 285.  
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concept into the human rights world. Specifically, the Law test merges the 
distinction between violation (a section 15(1) concern) and justification (at the 
section 1 Charter stage), with the effect that the claimant faces an increased burden 
to prove a violation of their right.59 The government enjoys a correspondingly 
reduced burden to justify its decisions. If this logic were to be extended outside of 
the Charter context, it means that private employers could discriminate more easily 
in the workplace and more easily resist adjudicative efforts to even the playing field. 
 
 
 A statutory adjudicator who recognizes the inherent interplay between 
constitutional and human rights instruments may be inclined to allow the Law 
principles to dominate the human rights analysis. A likely consequence of such a 
practice is “an elevated burden on a human rights claimant which effectively 
supplants the more appropriate evidentiary principles articulated in O’Malley.”60 
This is of immediate concern when only a small proportion of the complaints that are 
filed with human rights commissions ultimately make their way to a public hearing 
stage.61 This increased claimant burden would seemingly limit the potential for any 
meaningful evolution in human rights jurisprudence. Quite simply, too great of an 
emphasis on Law and even its successors Kapp62 and Withler63 outside of the 
constitutional realm, creates problems.  Too little attention will be given by statutory 
decision-makers to the “language of the enabling statute, the principles which have 
evolved through statutory human rights adjudications, the regulatory context in 
which statutory human rights allegations arise, the intent of the framers of the 
legislation, and the quasi-constitutional nature of human rights.”64 
 
 
 Statutory human rights do not enjoy the status of being constitutionally 
entrenched. As such, they require “appropriate contextual interpretation” in order to 
“give life to the values which underlie them.”65 The problem is that the human 
dignity concept or its Kapp and Withler successors become “element[s] of the burden 
of proof”, rather than a value or guiding force, which underscores the entire statutory 
scheme.66 To the extent that the Law test introduced a highly rigid, mechanistic, and 
unnecessarily formal method of screening equality claims, it follows that the 
importation of this test into the statutory context puts adjudicators directly at odds 
                                                
59 Greschner, supra note 53 at 306. 
60 Supra note 2 at 374. 
61 Supra note 2 at 374.  
62 Supra note 28. 
63 Withler v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 12, 1 SCR 396. 
64 Supra note 2 at 374. 
65 Supra note 2 at 374.  
66 Supra note 2 at 376. 
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with the broad wording of their enabling legislation and the generous and liberal 
reasoning of the O’Malley decision.67 
 
 
 The point is not that statutory human rights frameworks offer an inferior 
means of resolving claims, but rather, that they provide a “contextually different” 
arena through which to achieve broad principles of justice.68 With respect to 
statutory justifications and exemptions, Canadian courts consistently highlight the 
need to construe these limitations narrowly. A finding of no discrimination is limited 
to either the claimant’s failure to prove a prima facie case or to the respondent’s 
successful reliance on one of the listed defenses. Should an adjudicator be tempted to 
require “evidence of impairment to dignity” on the subjective-objective evidentiary 
standard, there would be a resulting elevation in the burden on the claimant.69 This 
increased onus would be “tantamount to creating a justification which is not 
articulated in either the statute or the Meiorin framework.”70 
 
 
 E. THE KAPP ERA: NEW TESTS? 
 
After the Kapp71 and Withler72 decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada there 
has been a retreat from the dignity analysis in Law73 as well as the more formal 
comparator analysis. This raises the question whether the importing of Charter 
analysis into human rights adjudication still poses a problem for claimants. One 
could argue that the strains imposed by Law on the marriage between human rights 
codes and section 15 of the Charter have been removed and the Supreme Court has 
signaled a return to the happier days of the Andrews74 analysis.  However, such a 
conclusion is premature. The Kapp case calls for a demonstration that the state by its 
actions or omissions is promoting either stereotyping or disadvantage. 
 
[L]aw does not impose a new and distinctive test for discrimination, but 
rather affirms the approach to substantive equality under s. 15 set out 
in Andrews and developed in numerous subsequent decisions. The factors 
cited in Law should not be read literally as if they were legislative 
dispositions, but as a way of focusing on the central concern of s. 15 
                                                
67 Supra note 2.  
68 Supra note 2 at 374. 
69 Supra note 2 at 391. 
70 Supra note 2 at 392. See also British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v 
British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union (BCGSEU) (Meiorin Grievance), [1999] 3 
SCR 3, SCJ No 46. 
71 Supra note 28. 
72 Supra note 63.  
73 Supra note 27.  
74 Supra note 1.  
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 identified in Andrews -- combatting discrimination, defined in terms of 
perpetuating disadvantage and stereotyping.75 
 
 
 Furthermore, both Kapp and Withler apply the four contextual factors from 
Law, albeit in a different way and not under the umbrella of dignity. Thus the 
Charter test still imposes a higher burden on the human rights claimant than the 
O’Malley one of the prima facie case. 
 
 
 In an excellent special issue of the Journal of Law and Equality in 2012, 
many of Canada’s top equality experts explore the post Kapp situation in the context 
of the important Tranchemontagne case. The general conclusion appears to be that 
the problem of importing Charter analysis into human rights adjudication has been 
reduced, but is still present. Strains and challenges to the marriage of the Charter and 
human rights codes still exist. 
 
 
In Tranchemontagne, the Court of Appeal for Ontario furthered the 
conflation of HR jurisprudence and the Charter by deciding that 
discrimination should have the same meaning in the Ontario Human Rights 
Code as the Charter. In particular, in both realms a person claiming 
discrimination must now demonstrate a distinction based on a prohibited 
ground that creates a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or 
stereotyping. 
 
The apparent appeal of uniformity can be misleading in this context. 
Rather than improve the law, uniformity here smooths away important 
distinctions, with significant implications for those who seek meaningful 
enforcement of their human rights.76  
 
 
 Denise Reaume emphasizes that the cases following Kapp have clearly 
placed upon the claimant in a section 15 Charter case the burden of proving 
stereotyping or disadvantage.77 
 
The most recent decisions of the Supreme Court seem to make 
stereotyping crucial to the establishment of a section 15 violation, placing 
the burden on the claimant to prove stereotyping rather than requiring the 
government to disprove it. 
… 
 
                                                
75 Supra note 28 at para 24. 
76 Supra note 12 at 5-6. 
77 Supra note 13. In this regard, Reaume cites the following cases to support that claim: Ermineskin Indian 
Band and Nation v Canada, [2009] 1 SCR 222 at para 190; Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson 
Colony, [2009] 2 SCR 567 at para 108; Withler v Canada (Attorney General), [2011] 1 SCR 396 at para 
34; Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v Cunningham, 2011 SCC 37 at para 39. 
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Making stereotyping effectively part of the definition of discrimination 
under section 15 places the burden on the claimant to prove that the 
legislation does indulge in stereotyping, whereas under the conventional 
approach to human rights adjudication under the codes, the burden falls on 
respondents to prove that their generalizations are accurate.78 
 
Denise Reaume summarizes the issues well. From the beginning of the Charter era, 
there has been borrowing back and forth in the human rights code and section 15 
jurisprudence, such as when the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the conclusion 
from human rights code jurisprudence that adverse effect discrimination counts as 
discrimination and incorporated that concept into the Charter jurisprudence. Thus an 
action with an unintended discriminatory effect is an equality violation as much as an 
action that intentionally discriminates.  The two bodies of jurisprudence have 
developed along parallel tracks. It may be that the codes and the Charter are directed 
at the same problem, but the result of recent developments is to produce a different 
conception of discrimination under the Charter than has been operational under the 
codes. The difference matters because the “former conception of discrimination is 
potentially wider in scope”.79 Denise Reaume and others argue that the tests for the 
codes should be protected from Charter encroachment. Traditionally, the burden to 
make out a prima facie case has been relatively light, one that is largely factual rather 
than normative.80 As will be discussed later in this article, the effect of conflating the 
Charter and human rights codes tests may be to make both routes to equality less 
accessible to needy claimants. 
 
 
 Denise Reaume encapsulates the situation in the following way: 
 
To summarize, there are two  significant  differences  between  the Charter 
test  and  the  conventional  code  analysis:  a  difference  in  onus  of proof 
and  a  difference  in  conception  of discrimination.  Imposing greater 
proof requirements  under  the  codes  makes  it  that  much  harder  for 
vulnerable  claimants  to  get  an  argument  off  the  ground.  More 
importantly, the Charter conception of equality seems bound up with 
finding stereotype.81 
 
 
IV. COMPARATOR GROUPS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONTEXT 
 
Another important way in which the section 15 Charter jurisprudence has limited the 
broad and flexible interpretation of human rights codes is with respect to comparator 
                                                
78 Supra note 13 at 81 and 82 respectively. 
79 Supra note 13 at 69. 
80 Supra note 13 at 70. 
81 Supra note 13 at 87. 
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groups. As the post Law82 Charter cases evolved, it became increasingly clear that 
an equality claim was often won or lost at the stage of selecting the appropriate 
comparator group. As early as Andrews, the Supreme Court recognized that equality 
is a comparative concept.83 However, the comparator analysis became increasingly 
rigid and formalized, as represented in Hodge v Canada84 and Auton v British 
Columbia.85 It is thus not surprising that many academics were concerned about the 
importation of this comparator analysis into the human rights code jurisprudence. 
 
 
 A. ACADEMIC CONCERN ABOUT COMPARATORS 
 
Andrea Wright was one of the early academic commentators to recognize the 
limiting effect of importing the Charter comparator analysis into statutory 
discrimination cases. She decries the growing trend of human rights tribunals relying 
on and often misusing comparator group analysis in the statutory context. She even 
questions the general assumption in section 15 Charter cases that equality is 
necessarily comparative. Referring to Charter comparator analyses she states: 
 
These formulas cause claimants to thread their discrimination experiences 
through templates that are ill-fitting and rigid, and that often operate like 
formal-equality analyses. The result is often the de-contextualization of the 
complaint and the denial of substantive equality.86  
 
 
 In another article, Daphne Gilbert and Diana Majury echo the concern 
raised above. Their article examines the role of comparator groups. The authors' 
position is that a comparator group approach impedes the equality analysis when it is 
imposed as a requirement and when it is used as a test the claimant has to meet, 
rather than as one of a number of potential analytic tools. They also go on to argue 
that to focus exclusively on a single, narrow comparison and to treat that comparison 
as determinative of the claim substitutes oversimplification for complexity. It can 
also sidestep much of the section 15 Charter jurisprudence and in so doing divest 
equality of much of its meaning.87  
 
 
                                                
82 Supra note 27. 
83 Supra note 1 at para 26.  
84 Hodge v Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), 2004 SCC 65, 3 SCR 357. 
85 Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 78, 3 SCR 657.  
86 Andrea Wright, “Formulaic Comparisons; Stopping the Charter at the Statutory Human Rights Gate” in 
Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike, and M Kate Stephenson (eds) Making Equality Rights Real: Securing 
Substantive Equality under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) at 409. 
87 Daphne Gilbert & Diana Majury, “Critical Comparisons: The Supreme Court of Canada Dooms Section 
15” (2006) 24 Windsor YB Access Just 111. 
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 In a later article Diana Majury is even more pessimistic about expanding 
section 15 Charter analysis into the human rights code context. She asserts that the 
gap between the Supreme Court of Canada analysis of equality and that preferred by 
feminists and other equality advocates is growing. She states: 
 
The fact that equality is the language enshrined in s.15 of the Charter 
supports a pragmatic argument for persisting with trying to make the 
language of equality meaningful and effective for those marginalized and 
oppressed people who continue to experience multitudes of inequalities in 
their daily lives and for persisting in trying to craft equality analyses that 
expose and offer ways out of systemic inequality.88 
 
 
 In both the Kapp89 case and even more specifically in Withler v Canada 
(AG)90, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged many of the academic critics 
and signalled a retreat from the rigid comparator analysis that evolved out of the Law 
case. The Court did not abandon the assertion articulated in Andrews91 that equality 
is a comparative concept, but it did call for a more flexible and less structured 
application of the comparator group analysis. The Court also left open the possibility 
that comparators are not always needed. 
 
 
 Nonetheless, as late as 2011 some academics were still expressing concern 
about the comparator analysis generally.92  Nathan Irving, in a report for the Council 
of Canadians with Disabilities, echoes these concerns and suggests that the most 
glaring illustration of the Charter’s comparator analysis infecting human rights code 
jurisprudence is illustrated in the lower court decisions in Moore.93 
 
 
 B. THE MOORE CASE 
 
Indeed, the comparator problem is directly confronted in the Moore v British 
Columbia94 case. This compelling case involved a claim that Jeffrey Moore, who has 
severe dyslexia, was denied equal access to education in the British Columbia 
                                                
88 Diana Majury, “Equality Kapped: Media Unleashed” (2009) 27 Windsor YB Access Just 1 at 7.  
89 Supra note 28. 
90 Supra note 63. 
91 Supra note 1. 
92 Hart Schwartz, “Making Sense of Section 15 of the Charter” (2011) 29 NJCL 201. He lamented the 
focus of section 15 Charter cases on comparator goups as turning the jurisprudence into an arcane and 
tedious game. 
93 Nathan Irving, “An Overview of the Comparator Group Analysis in Human Rights Jurisprudence” (6 
September 2009): Council of Canadians with Disabilities 
<http://www.ccdonline.ca/en/socialpolicy/poverty-citizenship/legal-protections/human-rights-
jurisprudence-group-analysis>. 
94 Moore, supra note 9.  
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education system. His father argued on his behalf that significant cuts to the 
services offered to learning disabled students, including this son, were discriminatory 
and resulted in a denial of equal access to an appropriate education. During the long 
process of litigation, starting with a human rights complaint in 1997 and culminating 
in a Supreme Court of Canada victory on November 9, 2012, Jeffrey Moore pursued 
his education in a private school.  
 
 
 Both the reviewing Divisional Court in Moore and Mr. Justice Low 
speaking for the majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal defined the 
relevant service as “special education.”95 The definition of the service and the use of 
comparators were the central issues in Moore. 
 
 
 In Eaton v Brant Co.96 special education was regarded as the reasonable 
accommodation necessary to give disabled children valuable access to the larger 
public education. In contrast to this case, Wynberg v Ontario (Education)97 defined 
the claim on behalf of autistic children as a claim to special education.  Thus, the 
proper comparator group(s) was other categories of disabled students. On the basis of 
this analysis the claim in Wynberg was defeated. 
 
 
 As we were completing this article the Supreme Court of Canada rendered 
its landmark decision in Moore.98  In an expansive and compelling decision Justice 
Abella agrees with the original human rights tribunal decision that Jeffrey Moore 
was discriminated against by the relevant school board.99 The core of her decision 
was the broad definition of the relevant “services” under the human rights code, as a 
meaningful access to education and not just to a sub category of “special education.” 
Justice Abella states as follows: 
 
The preamble to the School Act,[1]  the operative legislation when Jeffrey 
was in school, stated that “the purpose of the British Columbia school 
system is to enable all learners to develop their individual potential and to 
acquire the knowledge, skills and attitudes needed to contribute to a 
healthy, democratic and pluralistic society and a prosperous and 
sustainable economy”.  This declaration of purpose is an acknowledgment 
by the government that the reason all children are entitled to an education, 
is because a healthy democracy and economy require their educated 
                                                
95 British Columbia (Ministry of Education) v Moore, 2008 BCSC 264, 81 BCLR (4th) 107; Supra note 21 
at para 168.  
96 Eaton v Brant County Board of Education, [1997] 1 SCR 241. 
97 Wynberg v Ontario, [2006], OJ No 2732, 269 DLR (4th) 435. The Ontario Court of Appeal relied upon 
the earlier decision of Auton, supra note 85.  
98 Moore, supra note 9.  
99 The Court did not agree with the tribunal’s broad award of systemic remedies against the provincial 
Department of Education but rather laid the blame on the school board. 
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contribution.  Adequate special education, therefore, is not a dispensable 
luxury.  For those with severe learning disabilities, it is the ramp that 
provides access to the statutory commitment to education made to all 
children in British Columbia.100  
 
 
 In reaching this conclusion Justice Abella is in agreement with the 
dissenting approach of Justice Rowles in the British Columbia Court of Appeal, as is 
clearly articulated in the following passages from the Supreme Court decision.  
 
In dissent, Rowles J.A. would have allowed the appeal.  In her view, 
special education was the means by which “meaningful access” to 
educational services was achievable by students with learning disabilities.  
She found that a comparator analysis was both unnecessary and 
inappropriate.  The Tribunal’s detailed evidentiary analysis showing that 
Jeffrey had not received sufficiently intensive remediation after the closing 
of the Diagnostic Centre, justified the findings of discrimination.101 
. . .  
 
A central issue throughout these proceedings was what the relevant 
“service . . . customarily available to the public” was.  While the Tribunal 
and the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal defined it as “general” 
education, the reviewing judge and the majority defined it as “special” 
education. 
 
I agree with Rowles J.A. that for students with learning disabilities like 
Jeffrey’s, special education is not the service, it is the means by which 
those students get meaningful access to the general education services 
available to all of British Columbia’s students: 
 
It is accepted that students with disabilities require accommodation 
of their differences in order to benefit from educational services. 
Jeffrey is seeking accommodation, in the form of special education 
through intensive remediation, to enable him equal access to the 
“mainstream” benefit of education available to all. … In Jeffrey’s 
case, the specific accommodation sought is analogous to the 
interpreters in Eldridge: it is not an extra “ancillary” service, but 
rather the manner by which meaningful access to the provided 
benefit can be achieved. Without such special education, the 
disabled simply cannot receive equal benefit from the underlying 
service of public education. [Emphasis added; para. 103.]102 
 
 
 In these critical passages, the Supreme Court of Canada established two 
important principles. First, that a comparator analysis may be unnecessary and even 
inappropriate in some circumstances. It will be interesting to see if this observation 
                                                
100 Moore, supra note 9 at para 5. 
101 Ibid at para 25. 
102 Ibid at paras 27-28. 
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will be extended to the section 15 Charter analysis, as well as the human rights 
code context (the applicable one in Moore). Second, it agrees with Justice Rowles of 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal, that special education is the means by which 
disabled students can gain meaningful access to a general education, and is not itself 
the relevant “service” under the human rights code. The implications of this is that 
the adequacy of the special education services are more appropriately considered as a 
matter of reasonable accommodation at the justification stage of the human rights 
analysis. Broadly defining the services covered by human rights codes also promotes 
a broad and purposive interpretation of equality. 
 
 
 The retreat by the Supreme Court of Canada from the formalism of the 
comparator group analysis is made even more explicit in the following passage, as is 
the link to the section 15 Charter re-evaluation of comparators in Withler. This 
suggests that much of the logic in Moore would be equally applicable in a section 15 
Charter context. 
 
To define ‘special education’ as the service at issue also risks descending 
into the kind of “separate but equal” approach which was majestically 
discarded in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954).  Comparing Jeffrey only with other special needs students would 
mean that the District could cut all special needs programs and yet be 
immune from a claim of discrimination.  It is not a question of who else is 
or is not experiencing similar barriers.  This formalism was one of the 
potential dangers of comparator groups identified in Withler v. Canada 
(Attorney General), 2011 SCC 12 (CanLII), [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396.103 
 
 
 Instead of the problematic analysis above that the Supreme Court rejected, 
Justice Abella asserts that the core question is whether Jeffrey Moore and other 
disabled students, were given “meaningful access” to the general education services 
available in the province. In support of this proposition she cites various sources.104 
The possible impact of this expansive Supreme Court ruling is that human rights 
code jurisprudence may lead the way to more expansive rulings in respect to section 
15 Charter cases as well. We will return to this mutually enriching aspect of the 
marriage between human rights codes and the Charter in the final section of this 
article. 
 
 
 
                                                
103 Ibid at para 30. 
104 Ibid at para 34, where she references the following sources - Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General), [1997] 3 SCR 624, at para 71; University of British Columbia v. Berg, [1993] 3 SCR 353, at 
381-82.  (See also Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montréal 
(City), [2000] 1 SCR 665, at para 80; Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc., 
[2007] 1 SCR 650, at paras 121 and 162; A. Wayne MacKay, “Connecting Care and Challenge: Tapping 
Our Human Potential” (2008), 17 Educ & LJ 37, at 38 and 47.). 
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 C. CHILD WELFARE SERVICES FOR FIRST NATIONS CHILDREN 
 
How far courts will extend the Moore analysis even in the human rights code context 
remains to be seen. An interesting test case would be the challenge to child welfare 
services to on-reserve First Nations students as exemplified in Canada (Human 
Rights Commission) v Canada (AG).105 The factual context for this case was the 
considerably lower level of child welfare services provided to First Nations’ children 
living on a reserve in comparison to the child welfare services provided to children 
living off reserve. An added complication is that the federal government was the 
service provider for those on the reserve, while the various provinces were the 
relevant service provider for those living off the reserves. Thus the question of 
whether the child welfare services were a “service” within the meaning of section 5 
of the Canadian Human Rights Act106 was a complex one. 
 
 
 The case was referred to a tribunal by the Canadian Human Rights 
Commission. The tribunal’s decision is succinctly summarized by the reviewing 
Federal Court Trial Division as follows: 
 
The Tribunal then considered whether two different service providers 
could be compared to each other in order to find adverse differentiation 
under subsection 5(b) of the Act. Specifically, the Tribunal asked itself 
whether it could compare the child welfare services provided by the 
Government of Canada to those provided by the provinces in order to 
determine whether the Government of Canada had committed a 
discriminatory practice in the provision of services. 
 
In concluding that such a comparison could not be made, the Tribunal held 
that subsection 5(b) required a comparison to be made to services provided 
to others by the same service provider. Given that the Government of 
Canada did not provide child welfare services to recipients other than First 
Nations children living on reserves, it followed that there could be no 
adverse differentiation in the provision of services under subsection 5(b) of 
the Act. As a result, the Tribunal dismissed the complaint.107 
 
 
 The reviewing Federal Court reversed the human rights tribunal decision. In 
fact, the Court concluded that the tribunal’s decision was “unreasonable and flies in 
the face of the scheme and purposes of the Act, and leads to patently absurd results 
that could not have been intended by Parliament.”108 The Federal Court then 
addressed the proper role of comparator groups in a discrimination analysis in the 
following passages. 
                                                
105 Canada (Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General) 2012 FC 445 (Trial Division). 
106 Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6. 
107 Supra note 105 at paras 106-107. 
108 Supra note 105 at para 251. 
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While not a universally accepted proposition2, the Supreme Court of 
Canada has long held that equality is an inherently comparative concept, 
and that determining whether discrimination exists in a given case will 
often involve some form of comparison: Law Society British Columbia v. 
Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6 (QL) at para. 26. 
 
This does not mean, however, that there must be a formal comparator 
group in every case in order to establish discrimination under subsection 
5(b) of the Act. 
 
The onus is on a complainant to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination under the Canadian Human Rights Act. The test for 
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination is a flexible one, and does 
not necessarily contemplate a rigid comparator group analysis.109 
 
 
 In addition to the above reasons for reversing the decision of the human 
rights tribunal, the Federal Court referred to the dissenting reasons of Justice Rowles 
in the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in Moore.110 This is the reasoning 
that has now been upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada in Moore as well.111 The 
Federal Court also rejects the “similarly situated” approach to equality, in line with 
earlier Supreme Court rulings on this point.112 It also draws support from the general 
concern about comparators expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
 
As was noted earlier, the use of comparator groups in the statutory human 
rights context has been imported from the section 15 Charter 
jurisprudence. However, the Supreme Court of Canada has recently 
expressed real concern with respect to the role of comparator groups in the 
evaluation of section 15 claims. As will be discussed in the next section of 
these reasons, the recent decision in Withler v. Canada (Attorney General), 
2011 SCC 12, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396 lends further support for the view that 
the Tribunal’s interpretation of subsection 5(b) of the Act is 
unreasonable.113 
 
 
 In general the Federal Court calls for flexibility rather than rigidity in 
interpreting human rights. It appears to be in line with the thinking of the Supreme 
Court of Canada as expressed in Moore.114 At present the First Nations’ Children’s 
Services Case has been sent back to the human rights tribunal to hold a new hearing 
on the case. As this case winds its way through the legal process, it may provide an 
                                                
109 Supra note 105 at paras 281-283. 
110 Supra note 105 at para 287. 
111 Moore, supra note 9.  
112 Supra note 105 at paras 294-295. 
113 Supra note 105 at para 315. 
114 Moore, supra note 9. 
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interesting test of how far the de-emphasizing of comparator analysis will go. It 
certainly appears that the comparator analysis threat to human rights interpretation 
has been substantially reduced, if not eliminated completely. 
 
 
V. AMELIORATIVE PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS UNDER SECTION 15(2) OF THE 
CHARTER AND UNDER HUMAN RIGHTS CODES 
 
 
 A. THE DANGERS OF A TOUGH LOVE APPROACH 
 
Tranchemontagne indirectly raises some section 15(2) kind of issues like Kapp115 
and Cunningham,116 although the court of appeal does not reference these cases or 
section 15(2) itself. In Tranchemontagne the argument is that putting those addicted 
to alcohol under temporary welfare legislation117 is better for them in the long term 
than putting them on the disability program. It is a “tough love” approach of putting 
the alcoholics on lower benefits and thereby getting them back into the workforce 
more quickly. In that regard, it is analogous to the Gosselin v Quebec case where 
putting the claimants on lower benefits was justified as a kind of equity 
(ameliorative) program. It is also important to note that in Gosselin these good 
intentions of the legislators’ was a critical factor in allowing McLachlin for the 
majority, to conclude that there was no violation of section 15(1) at all. While this 
was done under the Law test much the same result could be reached using the Kapp 
analysis by trying to argue that this is a section 15(2) situation. In both cases there is 
no need to resort to section 1 of the Charter for justification. 
 
 
 This kind of analysis, whether in the Gosselin context or the one in 
Tranchemontagne, emphasizes that the Kapp section 15(2) approach allows the 
government to have an early opportunity to justify their actions or omissions.  The 
government can do this on the bases of good purposes or intentions on their part and 
thereby make an early exit from the Charter equality analysis. As both Kapp and 
Cunningham reinforce, the rational link between the ameliorative purpose and the 
means adopted to pursue that purpose does not have to be strong. The beneficial 
effects of the ameliorative program are largely left to the legislative and executive 
branches of the state, as a matter of public policy. This emphasizes a deferential role 
for courts, at both the violation and justification stages of Charter analysis. 
 
 
 This is even more concerning in the Charter context after the court’s 
decision in Cunningham.118 In Cunningham, several members of the Peavine Métis 
                                                
115 Supra note 28.  
116 Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v Cunningham, 2011 SCC 37, 2 SCR 670. 
117 Ontario Works Act, 1997, SO 1997, c 25, Schedule A. 
118 Supra note 116.  
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Settlement challenged the constitutionality of certain provisions of Alberta’s Métis 
Settlements Act (MSA).119 Sections 75 and 90(1) of the MSA prevented membership 
in a Métis settlement community to individuals who had registered for status under 
the Indian Act.120 The Court held that the purpose of the MSA was ameliorative, that 
being “to establish a Métis land base to preserve and enhance Métis identity, culture 
and self-government, as distinct from Indian identity, culture and modes of 
governance.”121 Significantly, the Court held that if the “government relies on s. 
15(2) to defend the distinction, the analysis proceeds immediately to whether the 
distinction is saved by s. 15(2)”.122 This degree of deference is of particular concern 
given that the “ameliorative program” forced the claimants to select one “identity”, 
and limited rather than expanded the rights of the individuals based on that sole 
identity. Arguments that section 15(2) should not allow an early exit from section 15 
Charter analysis, if the effect was limiting rather than advancing minority rights, 
failed to convince the Supreme Court. 
 
 
 What remains to be seen is the extent to which section 15(2) considerations 
will be taken into account by commissions and tribunals in the course of deciding the 
merits of human rights claims. An interesting and as of yet unresolved issue, is 
whether the respondent in a human rights case would first have the opportunity to 
invoke the equity defence before being required to justify the alleged discriminatory 
practice as satisfying the criteria for reasonable accommodation. As noted above, in 
Cunningham, the Supreme Court of Canada held that an equality claim should 
proceed directly to an analysis of section 15(2) if government relies on the 
provision.123 Interestingly, the language here appropriately focuses on the 
“government” as the actor – but what this means in terms of human rights claims is 
unclear. Absent the Charter context, if a respondent in a human rights case is relying 
on section 15(2), would the analysis also immediately move to whether the 
distinction is justified?  
 
 
 While the “tough love” explanation for putting alcoholics on short term 
welfare benefits, rather than the higher paying disability benefits, was not tied to 
importing either the Gosselin interpretation of Law, or the Kapp interpretation of 
section 15(2), it could have been. Thus in this section we raise a caution about 
possible future interpretations, whereby, section 15(2) analysis is imported into the 
interpretation of ameliorative / special statutory programs in human rights codes. 
One major danger of such an approach would be to focus the analysis on the 
purposes or intentions of the public or private services providers and to downplay the 
effects or effectiveness of such special programs under statutory human rights codes. 
                                                
119 Métis Settlements Act, RSA 2000, c M-14. 
120 Indian Act, RSC, 1985, c I-5, s 6.   
121 Supra note 116 at para 69. 
122 Supra note 116 at para 44.  
123 Supra note 116 at para. 44.   
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 B. PURPOSES VERSUS EFFECTS 
 
The first source of concern in the possible misapplication of section 15(2) in the 
human rights context is that its’ language suggests that the “legislative goal rather 
than actual effect” is the “paramount consideration in determining whether or not a 
program qualifies for section 15(2) protection.”124 Granted, there is no reason to 
blindly or “slavishly accept the government’s characterization of its purpose.”125 
There is nothing to prevent judges from critically examining the relevant legislation 
to “ensure that the declared purpose is genuine.”126 In this way, “a bald declaration 
by government that it has adopted a program” which has as its object the 
amelioration of conditions of disadvantage “does not ipso facto meet the 
requirements to sanctify the program under section 15(2) of the Charter. The 
government cannot employ such a naked declaration as a shield to protect an activity 
or program which is unnecessarily discriminatory.”127 
 
 
 However, despite this well-intentioned and cautious judicial approach 
outlined in Kapp, there is an inherent and undeniable danger in adopting a mentality 
that seeks to privilege purpose above effect. Commissions may be well positioned to 
identify the gravest of injustices, but may have little recourse when private 
employers’ conduct is somewhat suspect but sufficiently protected by a plausibly 
positive and ameliorative purpose. The mere fact that courts will refuse to allow 
governments to hide behind smokescreens in order to “protect discriminatory 
programs on colourable pretexts”128 does little to calm fears about the ability of 
employers to operate as they please within a wide range of tolerable conduct.  
 
 
 C. RATIONAL CONNECTION 
 
Courts are encouraged to look for a nexus or correlation between the “program and 
the disadvantage suffered by the target group.”129 This would suggest that there is at 
least some basis for judicial intervention and some opportunity for judicial remedies 
to respond to discriminatory treatment. However, the Court in Kapp insisted on 
preserving an “intent-based analysis”130 and explicitly sought to avoid turning any 
                                                
124 Supra note 28 at para 44.   
125 Supra note 28 at para 46.  
126 Supra note 28 at para. 46. 
127 Apsit Manitoba Rice Farmers Association v. Human Rights Commission (Man.), [1987] 50 Man R (2d) 
92 (QB) at para 51. 
128 Supra note 28 at para 54. 
 
129 Supra note 28 at para 49.  
130 Supra note 28.  
 UNB LJ     RD UN-B       [VOL/TOME 64] 86 
analysis of the “means employed by the government” into an assessment of the 
program’s effects. This would seem to limit in scope any meaningful review of the 
respondent’s conduct. Respondents are afforded a great measure of flexibility and 
discretion in deciding how to structure their programs.  
 
 
 The mere demonstration of a rational connection between the impugned 
program and a section 15(2) object renders unnecessary much if any, “attention to 
the position of the rights claimant” and wholly negates any “insistence on 
proportionality of government action.”131 There is no means of evaluating alleged 
affirmative action programs in the absence of “structured balancing.”132  
 
 
 In Tranchemontagne, there was a distinction drawn between persons 
suffering from substance dependence and those afflicted with more traditionally 
accepted forms of disability.  This distinction was seen as “necessary” and 
appropriate to create a program which provides financial assistance only to those 
disabled persons “sharing key features such that they may be grouped together” 
under the governing legislation.133 These features are said to be “related to the 
program’s purpose.”134  By “expressly referencing the eligibility restrictions in its 
legislated objective, the statute effectually circumscribes the scope of the benefit it 
intends to confer on persons identified as experiencing specific disadvantage and 
needing specific support.”135  
 
 
 The distinction in Tranchemontagne was supported by the government on 
the general, vague, and largely subjective grounds that the governmental program 
caters to the specific needs, capacities, and circumstances of the targeted group. On 
this analysis an employer would be free to design an (un)intentionally discriminatory 
workplace scheme drawn along equally arbitrary lines.136 A rational connection is a 
dangerously low standard for an employer to meet. Inasmuch as the government is 
presumed to act in the best interests of society, or is at least expected to operate with 
a broader public purpose in mind, the same cannot be said of private employers, who 
are more likely to be motivated by profit margins or bottom line considerations. In 
this sense, employers are arguably more likely to stretch, manipulate, and exploit 
what could be considered a rational connection. 
 
                                                
131 Jess Eisen, “Rethinking Affirmative Action Analysis in the Wake of Kapp: A Limitations-
Interpretation Approach” (2008) 6:1 JL & Equality 1. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Daniel Del Gobbo and Stephanie DiGiuseppe, “Transposing Tranchemontagne into the Charter 
Context: S. 15(2)” The Court (23 March 2010), online: The Court <http://www.thecourt.ca/>. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. 
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 D. AMELIORATIVE OBJECT 
 
Further, the Kapp test does not require that the ameliorative object be the sole object. 
Rather, it must simply be “one of several.”137 The Court reasons that it is unlikely 
that a “single purpose will motivate any particular program.”138 This is because “any 
number of goals are likely to be subsumed within a single scheme.”139 According to 
this logic, programs should not be prematurely denied section 15(2) protection on the 
grounds that they contain other, possibly competing, objectives. 
 
 
 While it is true that a “purpose-based approach” best positions state actors 
to do “whatever they wish” in eliminating discrimination, it does not automatically 
follow that such an approach allows the government to most effectively tackle 
discrimination.140 If a “well-intentioned program nevertheless has discriminatory 
effects, then intervention from a court which required the government to redesign the 
program would seem to help the government achieve its goal of combating 
discrimination, rather than to hinder it.”141 The exclusive focus on the government’s 
intended purpose rather than the program’s actual effects means that disadvantaged 
groups are without recourse “where a program has an ameliorative purpose but is 
under-inclusive” or where the program indirectly stigmatizes or harms some other 
disadvantaged group.142  
 
 
 The need for a section 15(1) analysis is easily avoided so long as the 
respondent can meet the low bar of showing the program has an ameliorative 
purpose and targets a disadvantaged group.143 Once this minimal requirement is 
satisfied, there is no consideration of whether the program is “appropriately 
inclusive” or whether it has “deleterious effects” on other vulnerable members of 
society.144 Yet a program can be simultaneously ameliorative in purpose and harmful 
in its effect.145  
 
 
                                                
137 Supra note 28 at para 50. 
138 Supra note 28 at para 51. 
139 Supra note 28 at para. 51.  
140 Sophia Moreau, “R v Kapp: New Directions for Section 15” (2008-2009) 40 Ottawa L Rev 283 at 295.  
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid.  
143 Ibid.  
144 Ibid at 296. 
145 Ibid. 
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 Kapp offers a clear example of a judicial body invoking a respondent’s 
“affirmative action argument” under the section 15(2) umbrella, for the purposes of 
bypassing the “rest of the s. 15(1) process.”146 The test to meet to escape a 
“reversion” to a section 15 review is “unnervingly low.”147 The focus on the 
purposes of the program means that “sincerity” and “plausibility” become the 
relevant standards, with the effect that “significant deference” is consciously 
afforded to the legislature.148 Such a deferential attitude demands little in the way of 
governmental justification or judicial review.149 
 
 
 In both a Charter and a human rights code context, the more sincere or 
plausible the justification, the more likely it is that employers can hide behind a 
policy that has adverse consequences for members of its workforce. The employer 
can rely on the fact that it is best positioned to respond to problems at its workplace – 
that its oversight of the daily operations, its knowledge of the everyday problems 
which arise make it uniquely capable of promoting fairness at its facilities. This 
argument becomes all the more convincing and all the more attractive to 
administrative bodies when sincerity and plausibility are relied on as primary 
screening factors. 
 
 
 E. AMELIORATIVE/SPECIAL PROGRAMS 
 
In Cunningham, Chief Justice McLachlin states that the goal of section 15 is to 
“enhance substantive equality.”150 She explains that this is achieved in two ways. 
First, section 15(1) “is aimed at preventing discrimination.”151 Second, section 15(2) 
is “aimed at permitting governments to improve the situation of members of 
disadvantaged groups that have suffered discrimination in the past, in order to 
enhance substantive equality.”152 Importantly, the Court states that section 15(2) 
accomplishes this by: 
 
[A]ffirming the validity of ameliorative programs that target particular 
disadvantaged groups, which might otherwise run afoul of s. 15(1) by 
excluding other groups. It is unavoidable that ameliorative programs, in 
seeking to help one group, necessarily exclude others. 
 
The purpose of s. 15(2) is to save ameliorative programs from the charge 
of “reverse discrimination”.  Ameliorative programs function by targeting 
                                                
146 Supra note 88 at 10. 
147 Supra note 88 at 11. 
148 Supra note 88.  
149 Supra note 88. 
150 Supra note 116 at para 38. 
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specific disadvantaged groups for benefits, while excluding others.  At the time 
the Charter was being drafted, affirmative action programs were being 
challenged in the United States as discriminatory — a phenomenon 
sometimes called reverse discrimination.  The underlying rationale of s. 
15(2) is that governments should be permitted to target subsets of 
disadvantaged people on the basis of personal characteristics, while 
excluding others.  It recognizes that governments may have particular 
goals related to advancing or improving the situation of particular subsets 
of groups.  Section 15(2)affirms that governments may not be able to help 
all members of a disadvantaged group at the same time, and should be 
permitted to set priorities. If governments are obliged to benefit all 
disadvantaged people (or all subsets of disadvantaged people) equally, 
they may be precluded from using targeted programs to achieve specific 
goals relating to specific groups.  The cost of identical treatment for all 
would be loss of real opportunities to lessen disadvantage and prejudice.153 
 
 
 Importantly, both the Charter and a variety of human rights codes have in 
place provisions that allow for affirmative action or “special programs.” Both section 
15(2) and these special program provisions in human rights codes recognize the 
“importance of dealing with historical disadvantage by protecting special programs 
to assist marginalized groups.”154 
 
 
 Some of the special programs provisions in human rights codes across 
Canada seem to align more with the Charter approach to focus on the purposes of 
the ameliorative program as opposed to the practical effects. For example, the Nova 
Scotia Human Rights Act special program provisions states: 
 
6 Subsection (1) of Section 5 does not apply 
(i) to preclude a law, program or activity that has as its object the 
amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or classes of 
individuals including those who are disadvantaged because of a 
characteristic referred to in clauses (h) to (v) of subsection (1) of Section 
5.155 (emphasis added) 
 
 
 Alternatively, other human rights codes do not use the language of “has as 
its object”, but utilize potentially broader language that could be interpreted to 
implicate more effects or impact-based analyses. The Ontario Human Rights Code 
states: 
 
 
                                                
153 Supra note 116 at para 40-41. 
154 Ontario Human Rights Commission, “Special Programs and the Ontario Human Rights Code: A Self-
Help Guide”, OHRC (11 November 2012), online: Ontario Human Rights Commission < 
http://www.ohrc.on.ca> 
155 Supra note 22 at s 6(i).  
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14.  (1) A right under Part I is not infringed by the implementation of a 
special program designed to relieve hardship or economic disadvantage or 
to assist disadvantaged persons or groups to achieve or attempt to achieve 
equal opportunity or that is likely to contribute to the elimination of the 
infringement of rights under Part I.156 (emphasis added) 
 
Further, the Canadian Human Rights Act also defines special programs as: 
 
16. (1) It is not a discriminatory practice for a person to adopt or carry out 
a special program, plan or arrangement designed to prevent disadvantages 
that are likely to be suffered by, or to eliminate or reduce disadvantages 
that are suffered by, any group of individuals when those disadvantages 
would be based on or related to the prohibited grounds of discrimination, 
by improving opportunities respecting goods, services, facilities, 
accommodation or employment in relation to that group.157 (emphasis 
added) 
 
 
 Special programs in human rights codes are protected in order to “protect 
affirmative action programs from challenge by people who do not experience 
disadvantage” and to “promote substantive equality, to address disadvantage and 
discrimination in all its forms.”158 While the current trend in section 15 
jurisprudence, as exemplified by Kapp and Cunningham, is to afford significant 
deference to the legislature, it remains to be seen whether or not this approach will 
transfer over to the human rights context. It is our view that the Charter approach to 
section 15(2) should not be imported into the analysis of special programs in a 
human rights code context. As with the section 15(1) analysis discussed earlier, there 
can be some useful overlap and cross fertilization but the Charter and human rights 
code structures should be kept separate. The different constitutional and statutory 
contexts justify maintaining separate and distinct approaches. Merging the two 
would likely result in a limitation on the potential scope of statutory human rights 
jurisprudence. 
 
 
VI. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DISCRIMINATION: SECTION 1 OF THE CHARTER AND 
BONA FIDE JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
The differences between a section 15 Charter challenge and one arising under a 
human rights code do not end at the violation stage discussed earlier. In some ways 
the differences are even more pronounced and the second stage of justification. In 
Meiorin,159 Chief Justice McLachlin eliminated the distinction between direct and 
                                                
156 Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H 19, s 14(1). 
157 Supra note 106 at s 16(1). 
158 Supra note 154.  
159 [British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v British Columbia Government 
and Service Employees’ Union (BCGSEU) (Meiorin Grievance), [1999] 3 SCR 3 at para 25, SCJ No 46. 
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indirect discrimination (adverse effects) by making reasonable accommodation a 
vital aspect of a bona fide justification. In doing so (on behalf of the Supreme Court), 
she cited as one of the reasons an unsatisfactory “dissonance” between Charter and 
human rights jurisprudence. As Justice Rowles points out in British Columbia v 
Moore160 even the desire to produce a greater unity between Charter and human 
rights jurisprudence, did not lead the Supreme Court to import the Law standard into 
the violation stages in Meiorin or Grismer. Furthermore, there was no suggestion 
that the approach to a section 1 Charter analysis should be imported into the human 
rights context. 
 
 
 A. MEIORIN/GRISMER ANALYSIS 
 
The Meiorin/Grismer test as the appropriate approach to justifying discrimination 
complaints in a human rights code context has been reinforced consistently in the 
cases. Coast Mountain Bus Co. v National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation 
and General Workers of Canada (CAW- Canada), Local 111161 confirms 
Meiorin/Grismer as the correct approach, with a possible modification of the third 
step, commenting as follows: 
 
The adjudicator in the present case did not make the error made by the 
Quebec Court of Appeal in Hydro-Québec.  She did not say the Employer 
was required to demonstrate it was impossible to accommodate employees 
with disabilities.  Rather, she stated that the issue was whether the 
Employer had demonstrated it was impossible to accommodate them 
without experiencing undue hardship.  Hence, the adjudicator was not 
incorrect in her formulation of the legal test, and the chambers judge erred 
in finding her to have been incorrect.162 
 
 
 In the hot off the press decision in Moore v British Columbia, Justice 
Abella, for a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada, reaffirms that Meiorin/Grismer 
provide the relevant test for justifying complaints of discrimination. Any reference to 
parallels with section 1 Charter analysis is absent. Having found that the School 
Board District had violated Jeffrey Moore’s rights under the human rights code, 
Justice Abella makes the following observations about the approach to justifications 
under the statute. 
 
 
                                                                                                               
This same approach was also applied in the services context in British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor 
Vehicles) v British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), [1999] 3 SCR 868 [“Grismer”]. 
160 Supra note 21 at paras 46-48.  
161 2010 BCCA 447. 
162 Ibid. at para. 90. The Québec Court of Appeal was reveresed in Hydro-Québec v. Syndicat des 
employé-e-s de techniques professionnelles et de bureau d’Hydro-Québec, section locale 2000 
(SCFP-FTQ), [2008] 2 SCR 561, 2008 SCC 43. 
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 The next question is whether the District’s conduct was justified. At this 
stage in the analysis, it must be shown that alternative approaches were 
investigated (British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations 
Commission) v. BCGSEU, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (“Meiorin”), at para. 65). The 
prima facie discriminatory conduct must also be “reasonably necessary” in 
order to accomplish a broader goal (Ontario Human Rights Commission v. 
Borough of Etobicoke, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 202, at p. 208; Central Okanagan 
School District No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970, at p. 984). In other 
words, an employer or service provider must show “that it could not have 
done anything else reasonable or practical to avoid the negative impact on 
the individual” (Meiorin, at para. 38; Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. 
Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489, at pp. 518-19; 
Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc., at para. 
130).163 
 
 
 Justice Abella in Moore did comment upon the unifying approach of the 
Meiorin analysis and the fact that it allowed not just for accommodations within the 
set standard, but also for a broader evaluation of the standard itself at a broader 
systemic level. 
 
… But in Meiorin, McLachlin J. observed that since few rules are framed 
in directly discriminatory terms, the human rights issue will generally be 
whether the claimant has suffered adverse effects.  Insightfully, she 
commented that upholding a remedial distinction between direct and 
adverse effect discrimination “may, in practice, serve to legitimize 
systemic discrimination” (para. 39).  The Meiorin/Grismer approach 
imposed a unified remedial theory with two aspects: the removal of 
arbitrary barriers to participation by a group, and the requirement to take 
positive steps to remedy the adverse impact of neutral practices. 
 
Meiorin and Grismer also directed that practices that are neutral on their 
face but have an unjustifiable adverse impact based on prohibited grounds 
will be subject to a requirement to “accommodate the characteristics of 
affected groups within their standards, rather than maintaining 
discriminatory standards supplemented by accommodation for those who 
cannot meet them” (Grismer, at para. 19).164   
 
 
 B. PARALLELS BETWEEN REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND SECTION 1 
 CHARTER ANALYSIS 
 
While the problems of importing the limiting section 1 Charter analysis into the 
justification stage of human rights code analysis has generally not emerged, there 
were some early hints that it might. These came in the form of some observations of 
                                                
163 Moore, supra note 9 at para 49.  
164 Ibid at paras 61-62. 
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Justice Laforest in Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General) in the form of 
the following two passages. 
 
It is also a cornerstone of human rights jurisprudence, of course, that the 
duty to take positive action to ensure that members of a disadvantaged 
groups benefit equally from services offered to the general public is 
subject to the principle of reasonable accommodation… In my view, in s. 
15(1) cases this principle is best addressed as a component of the s. 1 
analysis.  Reasonable accommodation, in this context, is generally 
equivalent to the concept of “reasonable limits”.  It should not be 
employed to restrict the ambit of s. 15(1). 
 
… 
 
In summary, I am of the view that the failure to fund sign language 
interpretation is not a “minimal impairment” of the s. 15(1) rights of deaf 
persons to equal benefit of the law without discrimination on the basis of 
their physical disability… Stated differently, the government has not made 
a “reasonable accommodation” of the appellants’ disability.  In the 
language of this Courts’ human rights jurisprudence, it has not 
accommodated the appellants’ needs to the point of “undue hardships”; see 
Simpsons-Sears, supra, and Central Alberta Diary Pool, supra.165 
 
 While Justice La Forest was in no way suggesting that the section 1 Charter 
analysis and the duty of reasonable accommodation under human rights codes were 
always a similar process, he did feel that they in part converged in that particular 
case. If there was any doubt about the Supreme Court of Canada’s position on the 
convergence of the Charter and human rights code justification systems, it was 
clarified by Chief Justice McLachlin in Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson 
County. 
 
The broader societal context in which the law operates must inform the s. 1 
justification analysis.  A law’s constitutionality under s. 1 of the Charter is 
determined, not by whether it is responsive to the unique needs of every 
individual claimant, but rather by whether its infringement of Charter 
rights is directed at an important objective and is proportionate in its 
overall impact… The question the court must answer is whether the 
Charter infringement is justifiable in a free and democratic society, not 
whether a more advantageous arrangement for a particular claimant could 
be envisioned.166 
 
 
 This contrast between the focus on the individual parties in a human rights 
complaint and the broader social and societal nature of a Charter complaint was also 
raised in the earlier case of Multani v Commission Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys 
where Justices Abella and Deschamps explain as follows. 
                                                
165 Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 SCR 624 at paras 79 and 94 respectively.  
166 Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Country, [2009] 2 SCR 567 at para. 69. 
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The process required by the duty of reasonable accommodation takes into 
account the specific details of the circumstances of the parties and allows 
for dialogue between them.  This dialogue enables them to reconcile their 
positions and find common ground tailored to their own needs. [para. 
131]167  
 
 
 The differences between the process under a section 15 Charter analysis 
and a discrimination complaint under a human rights code were also recognized in 
Ontario v Tranchemontagne in the following paragraphs. 
 
However, fundamental differences exist between the Charter and the 
Code, including differences in: the nature of the legislation (constitutional 
versus quasi-constitutional); the scope of the guarantees provided (the 
Charter contains a broad equality guarantee while the Code creates a 
limited right to be free of discrimination in prescribed areas); the 
circumstances in which the guarantees will apply (the Charter is restricted 
to government conduct while the Code applies to both private and public 
actors); and, finally, the specific exemptions or defences that are available 
(s. 15 of the Charter contains an absolute prohibition against 
discrimination but s. 1 of the Charter provides a limited defence of 
justification, while the Code prohibits discrimination absolutely but also 
contains some absolute exemptions and defences): see Andrews at pp. 175-
176. 
 
Because of these differences, the precise nature of the evidence to be led 
and the stringency of the test to be applied to establish discrimination may 
vary and ultimately will depend significantly on the context.  … 
 
I find support for my conclusion about the meaning of discrimination in 
the human rights context in the concurring reasons of Abella J. in McGill 
University Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v Syndicat des 
employés de l'Hôpital général de Montréal, [2007] 1 SCR 161.168 
 
 
 C. DEFERENCE IS CRITICAL 
 
The balancing processes involved in justifying both violations of section 15 of the 
Charter and discrimination under human rights codes have similarities. However the 
critical difference is the degree of deference (or margin of appreciation) that should 
be shown to the rights violator. The need for a considerable degree of deference in 
the section 15 Charter context is well established and the following passage from 
Wynberg v Ontario makes this point clearly. 
 
                                                
167 Multani v Commission Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 6, [2006] 1 SCR 256. 
168 Ontario (Disability Support Program) v Tranchemontagne, 2010 ONCA 593, at paras 88, 89 and 92 
respectively. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada has held repeatedly that where the government 
has made a difficult policy choice regarding the claims of competing 
groups, or the evaluation of complex and conflictng research, or the 
distribution of public resources, or the promulgation of solutions which 
concurrently balance benefits and costs for many different parties, then the 
proper course of judicial conduct is deference.169  
 
 
 The issue of deference is not as clear in a human rights code context. First, 
the codes apply to both private and public respondents, unlike the Charter, which 
only applies to the public sector. The case for deferring to the private economic 
decisions of an employer or private service provider is not clear. Second, even in the 
public sector, the legislation which creates the human rights structure has built in 
balances between the claimants and the respondents and if either party is not happy 
with the balance they can lobby through the political process to get an amendment.  
The Charter is entrenched and any changes require a much more difficult 
constitutional amendment process. 
 
 
 That does not mean that deference has no relevance in a human rights 
process. This is demonstrated to some extent, in the Supreme Court of Canada 
decision in Moore v British Columbia170, when Justice Abella addresses the issues of 
justification in the human rights code context. 
 
More significantly, the Tribunal found, as previously noted, that the 
District undertook no assessment, financial or otherwise, of what 
alternatives were or could be reasonably available to accommodate special 
needs students if the Diagnostic Centre were closed.  This was cogently 
summarized by Rowles J.A. as follows: 
 
The Tribunal found that prior to making the decision to close [the] 
Diagnostic Centre, the District did not undertake a needs-based 
analysis, consider what might replace [the] Diagnostic Centre, or 
assess the effect of the closure on severely learning disabled 
students. The District had no specific plan in place to replace the 
services, and the eventual plan became learning assistance, which, 
by definition and purpose, was ill-suited for the task. The 
philosophy for the restructuring was not prepared until two months 
after the decision had been made (paras. 380-382, 387-401, 895-
899). These findings of fact of the Tribunal are entitled to 
deference, and undermine the District’s submission that it 
discharged its obligations to investigate and consider alternative 
means of accommodating severely learning disabled students 
before cutting services for them. Further, there is no evidence that 
the District considered cost-reducing alternatives for the continued 
operation of [the] Diagnostic Centre. [Emphasis added; para. 143.] 
                                                
169 Supra note 97 at para 184.  
170 Moore, supra note 9. 
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The failure to consider financial alternatives completely undermines what 
is, in essence, the District’s argument, namely that it was justified in 
providing no meaningful access to an education for Jeffrey because it had 
no economic choice.  In order to decide that it had no other choice, it had 
at least to consider what those other choices were. 171  
 
 
 This unwillingness to defer to the financial choices made by the District 
School Board were in part counter balanced by a greater show of deference to the 
need for financial cuts by the Department of Education at the provincial level. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada reversed the first level human rights tribunal 
on its broad award of systemic remedies against the province. It did this not as a 
matter of principle, but because the Court felt that the link between the provincial 
cuts to education and the discrimination suffered by Jeffrey Moore, was too remote a 
link. 
 
 
 The above conclusion was not stated in terms of deference but that appeared 
to be a factor, at least between the lines of the decision. As in the earlier Charter 
equality challenge in Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v NAPE,172 the Supreme Court 
of Canada was sensitive to the needs of the legislatures to respond to matters of 
financial crisis. It is one thing to require school boards to manage even reduced 
budgets, in a way that does not discriminate; it is quite another to second guess the 
legislative and the executive branches, as to the need for and extent of budget cuts. 
Thus deference can have some role to play even in the human rights context. 
 
 
 In the Moore case Abella J. for the Supreme Court of Canada recognises 
that even in respect to a human rights code challenge to government benefits, such as 
education, some degree of deference is owed to the service provider. She does not 
directly address whether the “margin of deference” should be different in a section 
15 Charter context and the human rights code context presented in Moore. 
 
… As with many public services, educational policies often contemplate 
that students will achieve certain results.  But the fact that a particular 
student has not achieved a given result does not end the inquiry.  In some 
cases, the government may well have done what was necessary to give the 
student access to the service, yet the hoped-for results did not follow. 
Moreover, policy documents tend to be aspirational in nature, and may not 
reflect realistic objectives.  A margin of deference is, as a result, owed to 
governments and administrators in implementing these broad, aspirational 
policies.173 
 
                                                
171 Moore, supra note 9 at para 52. 
172 Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v NAPE, 2004 SCC 66, 3 SCR 381. 
173 Moore, supra note 9 at para 35. 
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Justice Abella concludes that even with a show of deference, discrimination 
occurred when there was a denial of “meaningful” access to education.174 
 
 
 At the end of the day, the justification processes and approaches in Charter 
and human rights contexts should continue to be treated differently. There are of 
course points of overlap in some particular cases and some convergence of the 
approaches may enrich the equality process. The range of different interests at stake 
in these two contexts, and the need to engage in a broader social balance in the 
Charter setting, emphasizes the need for separation at this stage as well as at the 
violation stage. 
 
 
VII. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR EQUALITY SEEKERS: REMEDIES OF LAST 
RESORT 
 
Although the importation of the section 15 Charter framework into statutory human 
rights jurisprudence is troubling in terms of substantive equality theory, there are 
also significant practical implications for claimants that must be considered. The 
decision to import the section 15 analytical framework has real financial, temporal, 
and outcome-based consequences for the claimant pursuing a discrimination claim. 
As a result of these consequences, access to justice is devalued and considerably 
limited. 
 
 
 Hart Schwartz explains that “human rights should be clear and 
understandable”, and that “Human Rights Commissions and Tribunals need to be 
accessible to many people, most of whom are not lawyers.”175 However, there is no 
definitive analytical structure in place that may be considered the standard to abide 
by in human rights jurisprudence. There is inconsistency between whether the 
O’Malley or section 15 Charter structure should be employed,176 and this leads to 
unpredictability as to what the courts will require of claimants.  
 
 
 What are the consequences of unclear, or inconsistent, approaches to human 
rights in Canada? First, if section 15 tests are imported into human rights 
jurisprudence, it is obvious that the Charter standards will now be applicable to the 
                                                
174 Moore, supra note 9 at para 36. 
175 Supra note 92 at 201-202. 
176 Examples of cases that discuss the appropriate analytical structure include Canadian Human Rights 
Commission v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FC 445, 2012 CarswellNat 1026; Moore v British 
Columbia (Ministry of Education), 2010 BCCA 478, 326 DLR (4th) 77; Ontario (Disability Support 
Program) v. Tranchemontagne, 2010 ONCA 593. These cases are explored at length earlier in this article. 
 UNB LJ     RD UN-B       [VOL/TOME 64] 98 
private sector.177 Second, if there is any uncertainty as to what is required of the 
claimant in proving discrimination, human rights are not “clear and understandable”. 
If the inconsistencies remain, “accessibility” in a broad sense will also be at stake. 
Any claimant who is unsure of what is required of them to make a claim before a 
court or tribunal would not feel as if that system were “accessible”. Ultimately, it is 
important to pause and consider – will claimants bear the burden of an unpredictable 
approach to the violation analysis or justification of discrimination? 
 
 
 Claire Mumme suggests that many claimants choose to pursue an equality 
claim via human rights commissions and tribunals rather than a constitutional 
challenge because “of the perceived formality and formulaic nature of the section 15 
Charter analysis over the past few decades, as well as the time and cost involved. 
This has made a constitutional equality claim the last legal resort for many”. She 
further notes that the O’Malley test is “arguably easier” for claimants to meet.178 If, 
as Mumme suggests, the constitutional equality claim is the last legal resort for 
claimants, what effect does placing that formulaic test on human rights code claims 
have? Would this, in turn, result in both (and therefore, all) routes to pursuing a 
discrimination claim becoming the path of last resort?  
 
 
 In comparison to the O’Malley test, the section 15 structure is lengthy and 
onerous. This has direct and serious implications for claimants. For example, 
Maurina Beadle, the mother of 17-year-old Jeremy Meawasige from Pictou Landing 
First Nation, fought in the courts for her right to provide care at home to her son who 
has hydrocephaslus, autism, and cerebral palsy. Ms. Beadle had provided for all of 
Jeremy’s care without government assistance, until she suffered a stroke in 2010. 
Upon applying for government funding for home health care, Ms. Beadle found 
herself in a jurisdictional conflict in which the Federal government would not pay for 
health care services unless Jeremy moved off the reserve and into a facility outside 
the Pictou community.179   
 
 
 As part of her challenge, Ms. Beadle and her lawyer, Paul Champ, 
submitted that denying a disabled First Nations child on-reserve the health care 
                                                
177 Raj Anand & Tiffany Tsun, “Discrimination and Equality Rights: The Role of Human Rights Statutes 
in Advancing Equality” (2009) 25 NJCL 161. They argue that the Charter and human rights codes should 
supplement each other. 
178 Supra note 40.  This argument is further fortified by the argument that the Supreme Court of Canada is 
becoming “Charter averse,” K. Makin, “Supreme Court becoming “Charter averse” expert says” Toronto 
Globe and Mail (April 13, 2013). 
179 “Mother fights to keep disabled son on N.S. reserve” CBC News (12 June 2012), online: 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/story/2012/06/11/ns-health-care-pictou-landing-reserve.html. 
Ms. Beadle is looking to invoke “Jordan’s Principle.” Jordan’s Principle is a child-first policy passed in 
the House of Commons in 2007, named in honour of Jordan River Anderson of Norway House Cree 
Nation. Jordan spent his entire life in a hospital while the province of Manitoba and the government of 
Canada engaged in a jurisdictional argument over who was responsible for funding his care at home. 
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services available to any child off reserve is in conflict with section 15 of the 
Charter.180 Although Justice Mandimen, who heard the case, acknowledged its time-
sensitive nature, the decision will still take time – which does not serve the interests 
of Jeremy. As Ms. Beadle acknowledged “this case won’t necessarily change things 
for Jeremy, by the time it’s over”.181 
 
 
 As this article goes to press, the Federal Court decision of Justice 
Mandimen was released on April 4th, 2013. In that decision, the court quashed the 
decision that the funding could not be provided, and found that the Federal 
Government and Health Canada were responsible for reimbursement, of an 
unspecified amount, to the Pictou Landing Band Council (PLBC) for Jeremy’s care. 
Interestingly however, the section 15 Charter arguments were not the ones that won 
the day. The Judge made the decision based on the application of a common law 
doctrine, known as Jordan’s principle. This principle is meant to prevent access to 
service delays to First Nation children because of jurisdictional arguments.182 
 
 
 In the landmark case of Jeffrey Moore, his father, Mr. Frederick Moore, on 
behalf of his son, filed a human rights complaint against the Board of Education of 
School District #44 (North Vancouver) in May 1997. Jeffrey had begun kindergarten 
in September 1991 while at Braemar Elementary School, a British Columbia public 
school. While there, he was diagnosed as having severe dyslexia. By the end of grade 
two, Jeffrey was diagnosed as severely learning-disabled.  This entitled the school 
district to supplemental funding from the Ministry of Education to support Jeffrey’s 
learning. However, the specialized Diagnostic Center that was recommended for 
Jeffrey was closed due to financial reasons, before he could attend.  
 
 
 In 1999, Mr. Moore filed a second human rights complaint against the 
Ministry of Education. The hearing before the Tribunal took place in 2001, 2002 and 
2005, with a decision being released in 2005. In response to the Tribunal’s decision, 
the School District and Ministry brought petitions forward for judicial review of the 
case. The case was taken to the British Columbia Supreme Court in 2008 and the 
Court of Appeal for British Columbia in 2010.183  
 
 
 The case ultimately was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada and a 
unanimous decision was released on November 9, 2012. Justice Abella, writing for 
                                                
180 Moira Peters, “Boudreau is the Law”: The legal nature of an exception, and health care for First 
Nations children” (19 June 2012): Halifax Media Co-op <http://halifax.mediacoop.ca/blog/moira-
peters/11425>. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Pictou Landing Band Council and Maurina Beadle v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FC 342.   
183 Moore, supra note 95; Supra note 21. 	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the Court, was notably deferential to the findings of the human rights tribunal in 
affirming that Jeffrey had been discriminated against both individually and 
systemically. This approach of deference to the tribunal is reminiscent of Justice 
L’Heureux-Dube in Mossop.  However, the difference is that Justice L’Heureux-
Dube was dissenting in Mossop, and Justice Abella in Moore was writing for a 
unanimous court.184  
 
 
 Although the Supreme Court of Canada in Moore rejected systemic 
remedies against the Department of Education that were awarded by the Tribunal, 
the Moore case is a striking example of human rights commissions and tribunals 
leading the way on equality rights. The broad interpretation by Justice Abella of 
‘services’ encompassing education generally and not just “special education”, is an 
example of how a human rights tribunal can function as a leader in achieving 
substantive equality. The Supreme Court in Moore explained that “to define ‘special 
education’ as the service at issue also risks descending into the kind of ‘separate but 
equal’ approach.”185One institutional structure should enhance the other and not 
impose new external limits. That is what happened in the Moore case. 
 
 
 The contrast between the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Moore186 
under the human rights code structure and its earlier decision in Auton v British 
Columbia187 under section 15 of the Charter, is striking. In Auton the particular 
therapy sought for the children with autism was not a benefit encompassed within the 
British Columbia statutory structure. However, even if it had been included the 
Supreme Court compared the claimant group to other narrowly defined disabled 
groups, rather than the larger group of people seeking medically needed services. 
This could be construed as the “separate but equal” analysis that the Supreme Court 
rejected in Moore, albeit in a human rights code rather than a Charter context. As 
discussed earlier, the importation of a section 15 Charter narrower comparator 
analysis would have defeated Jeffrey Moore’s claim. Indeed, this was the basis of the 
majority decision at the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Moore, where the 
relevant comparator was deemed to be other groups seeking different forms of 
special education.188  
 
 
 It will be interesting to watch whether the expansive approach to equality 
demonstrated in Moore will be used in future section 15 Charter claims to chart a 
broader course in the constitutional context. If so, this would be an example of the 
                                                
184 Canada (Attorney General) v Mossop, [1993] 1 SCR 554, SCJ No 20. 
185 Moore, supra note 9 at para 30.  
186 Moore, supra note 9. 
187 Supra note 85. 
188 Supra note 21. 
[2013] THE MARRIAGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS CODES AND SECTION 15  
      
101 
human rights code jurisprudence enriching the section 15 Charter analysis. This 
would be a positive development. 
 
 
 A. ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
 
Although the Moore decision is to be commended, Jeffrey Moore is no longer 
enrolled in elementary school; he has long since completed both elementary and high 
school. He is now gainfully employed as a plumber in British Columbia.189 
Evidently, human rights commissions and tribunals are not without problems in cost 
and delay. For example, common complaints and concerns regarding the human 
rights process in British Columbia included “delays at intake and investigation” and 
“duration, complexity and costs of the process”,190 and the Moore case exemplifies 
these concerns. However, we should not shift towards importing a section 15 
Charter analysis that increases complexity, extends the process, and raises the costs 
for claimants, as importing section 15 will do? Instead, we should focus on 
improving the human rights process in order to ensure an efficient, effective, and 
accessible system for any and all equality claimants.  
 
 
 Access to justice has been characterized as a crisis in Canada.191 In 2007, 
during her remarks to the Canadian Bar Association, Chief Justice Beverley 
McLachlin stated that “access to justice is the essential foundation for our legal 
system to function and to maintain the confidence of the public it serves”.192 
However, in 2010-2011, approximately 670,000 applications for legal aid were 
submitted to legal aid plans in ten provinces and territories (excluding Alberta, 
Northwest Territories and Nunavut) with civil matters making up over 56% of the 
applications.193 In British Columbia, 90% of civil litigants are unrepresented.194 If the 
importation of section 15 into human rights jurisprudence continues, this trend of 
self-representation may continue. The cost and length of pursing either a section 15 
Charter claim or a human rights code claim could prove to be too much for most 
claimants to bear.  
                                                
189 Kirk Makin, “Rights of special needs students upheld”, The Globe and Mail (10 November 2012) A7. 
190 Deborah K. Lovett & Angela R. Westmacott, Human Rights Review: A Background Paper (Victoria: 
Administrative Justice Project, 2001), online: Administrative Justice Office 
<http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/ajo/down/hrr.pdf> [Human Rights Review] at 67. The human rights process in 
British Columbia has been changed in response to such concerns by allowing direct tribunal access. 
191 The Canadian Bar Association, Canada’s Crisis in Access to Justice (Ottawa: 2006), online: 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/info-ngos/canadianbarassociation.pdf>. 
192 Chief Justice of Canada Beverley McLachlin, Remarks of the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, 
P.C. to the Council of the Canadian Bar Association at the Canadian Legal Conference (Calgary: 2007), 
online: <http://www.cba.org/cba/calgary2007/pdf/chiefjustice_remarkscouncil.pdf> at 4.  
193 Statistics Canada, Legal Aid in Canada: Resource and Caseload Statistics (Ottawa: 2012), online: 
<http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85f0015x/85f0015x2011000-eng.pdf>.  
194 Sharon Matthews, Making the Case for the Economic Value of Legal Aid Briefing Note (2012), online: 
<http://cba.org/bc/practice_resources/pdf/Economic_Value_of_Legal_Aid-Briefing_Note.pdf>.  
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 In the Ryder article, the authors note that “we need more investigation of 
the impact of legal decisions on political actors and policy development, and, 
perhaps, most importantly, we need more inquiries into how and in what ways policy 
changes generated by equality litigation, are actually having an impact on the lives of 
equality litigants and the groups they represent.” 195 There needs to be more 
empirical analysis on the impact of changes in equality theory and practices on the 
everyday lives of the front line equality claimants. The law should be interpreted in a 
way that advances rather than limits their pursuit of equality. 
 
 
 The approaches under section 15 of the Charter and human rights 
jurisprudence are intrinsically linked by what they try to achieve: substantive 
equality. However, achieving substantive equality is a dynamic and complex pursuit, 
and complex pursuits require complex solutions. It is not enough to suggest that 
there is a one-size-fits-all test to determining or justifying discrimination. The 
approach to human rights under O’Malley is a model that allows for both 
contextualized claimant experiences and systemic discrimination complaints. Rather 
than making human rights equality claims more difficult for claimants by importing 
the section 15 Charter analysis, we should be actively working to achieve a multi-
faceted approach to ending discrimination. We need an approach that works to solve 
the access to justice crisis, rather than perpetuate it.  
 
 
 Maintaining distinct but mutually reinforcing human rights codes and 
Charter structures is the best route to making equality claims more accessible to the 
most vulnerable members of Canadian society. In that vein, the Supreme Court of 
Canada will hopefully expand upon its advances for equality in Moore, in a way that 
maintains the distinct identities of the section 15 Charter and human rights code 
structures. The best marriages are those in which the individual partners maintain 
their own identities but also enrich rather than limit each other’s lives. This is our 
hope for the marriage of human rights codes and section 15 of the Charter. 
                                                
195 Ryder, supra note 6 at 114.   
